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THE ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE 
Conflicting claims to territory can sometimes spark wars even though the 
territories themselves are small and hardly touch the national life or economic 
interests of the nations involved. The war between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom over the Falkland Islands is an example. When such disputes have 
arisen between Catholic kingdoms and nations, the Holy See has sometimes 
been able to serve as a mediator in reaching a fair and amicable settlement. The 
successful papal mediation (1979-1985) of a border dispute between Argentina 
and Chile is a casein point. Understandably, disputes which resulted in fighting 
have attracted far more attention from historians than have disputes settled by 
negotiations. A territorial conflict poisoned relations between Rudolf II, Holy 
Roman Emperor (1576-1612) and Stephan Bathory, Prince of Transylvania 
(1571-1576) and King of Poland (1576-1586). 
Contemporary documents usually refer to the territory in question as Szat-
mar (now Satu-Mare) and Nemethy, but several neighboring villages were also 
included in the dispute. Szatmar, the main city involved, is now in Romania, 
close to the point where Transylvania borders Hungary and the Ukraine. The 
city, which was strongly fortified, was located in the sixteenth century on a small 
island in the Somesul (Somes) River, a tributary of the Tisza River, which in 
tum flows into the Danube. Nemethy lay just across the Somesul to the northeast 
of Szatma~. 
1 I wish to thank Michael Zeps, S.l., Ryan Kelsey, and A. Lynn Martin for suggestions which 
have improved this essay. A short version was delivered to the Sixteenth Century Studies Confe-
rence in SI. Louis, 1993. 
2 There is an engraving of Szatmar (from 1689) in 1. DP,.BROWSKI, editor, Etienne Btitory: Roi 
de Pologne, Prince de Transylvanie (Krakow 1935) 24. A comparison of modem maps with that 
of Transylvania in G. DE lODE'S, Speculum Orbis Terrarum (Antwerp 1578; reprinted Amster-
dam 1965) Part II, map X, suggests that the course of the Some sui has shifted since the sixteenth 
century. The Vatican Archives contain a large (four folio pages) hand-drawn map of the disputed 
territories (reproduced at the end of this article); it is addressed to the Cardinal Secretary, Tolo-
meo Gallio (327v), in the autograph of Antonio Possevino, the papal legate and mediator of the 
Szatmar dispute, probably early in 1582: Nunz. Germ. 93 327. 
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Disputed territorial claims usually have complex roots. The controversy 
over Szatmar and adjacent territories goes back to the Ottoman victory at the 
Battle of Mohacs on 28 August 1526. Following their victory the Turks occu-
pied most of Hungary. Meanwhile the majority of the Hungarian nobility elected 
John Zapolya, the Prince of Transylvania to be their king, while a minority rec-
ognized the claims of the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand, brother of Charles V 
and King of Bohemia. When Charles V abdicated in 1556, Ferdinand became 
Emperor Ferdinand I, but his Hungarian possessions were in fact confined to the 
northern fringe of medieval Hungary, while the Ottomans controlled the vast 
majority of the Kingdom. Ferdinand's army had defeated Zapolya 's troops in 
1527 and forced him to flee to Poland in 1528. Zapolya's only hope was Ot-
toman support. In 1528 he received Turkish military support and recognition as 
King of Hungary. He died in 1540 and was succeeded by his infant son, John 
Sigismund. In 1540 and 1541 Turkish troops occupied most of the Hungarian 
territory which Zapolya had ruled, but they did recognize John . Sigismund as 
Prince of Transylvania, which he continued to rule under Ottoman overlordship 
until his death in 1571. His elected successor was Stephan Bathory, who was 
Prince of Transylvania from 1571 to 1576 and King of Poland from 1576 until 
his death in 15863. 
Szatmar and its adjacent villages were minuscule compared to the vast Pol-
ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but the Szatmar territories were family lands for 
Stephan Bathory, and he was deeply and personally involved in the events that 
led to the Habsburg repossession of these lands. There is little doubt that their 
loss to the Habsburgs represented for Bathory an affront to his honor both as a 
Bathory and as Prince of Transylvania and King of Poland. In this dispute the 
question of honor and traditional claims weighed far more than the economic or 
military worth of the lands in dispute. Such claims generally loomed large in six-
teenth century diplomacy. Although in these years Transylvania had a mixed 
population of Hungarians, Romanians and Germans, considerations of national-
ity and ethnicity hatdly surfaced during the protracted negotiations between 
Rudolf II and Bathory. In the Convention of Leles of 1543 Ferdinand had ac-
knowledged Andrea, Christopher and Stephan Bathory as having dominion «op-
pldi Zathmar et Nemethy ac possessionum et villarum ad id pertinentium». Ad-
ditional documents issued in 1544 and 1548 confirmed these family posses-
sions4. 
After the abdication of Charles V in 1556, the Transylvanian Diet recalled 
John Sigismund from exile in Poland. It was Stephan Bathory who served as the 
spokesman for the delegation that greeted the Prince as he crossed the border on 
his return. But Ferdinand I was not inclined to accept a Transylvania indepen-
dent of his Kingdom of Hungary and sent a delegation to Constantinople in 1556 
3 Ferenc SzAKAL Y, The Early Ottoman Period, including Royal Hungary, in A History of 
Hungary, edited by Peter SUGAR et aL (Bloomington 1990) 83-85. 
4 The documents are cited and quoted by Antoine ALoAsY, La gemfalogie de la famille Ba-
thory in Etienne Batory, 15. 
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to assert his claims to Transylvania. Suleiman did not accept his claims, and war 
broke out between John Sigismund and Ferdinand I in the spring of 1557. The 
conflict, which nicely suited Ottoman purposes, was a series of sieges along the 
forty fortresses that guarded the frontier. Truces broke the actual fighting in this 
war, which dragged on from 1557 to 1567. 
No fortress was more important than Szatmar, which John Sigismund put 
under the command of Stephan Bathory. Bathory was defending not only his 
country but his own personal estates. In the autumn of 1557 Habsburg troops be-
sieged the fortress, but stout resistance and the approach of a Transylvanian 
army forced them to retreat in December of 1557. Bathory then defended the 
Tisza River line farther to the north until peace negotiations began in 1559-1560. 
These reached ,a provisional agreement, but war broke out again in 1561 when 
the leading Transylvanian general, Melchior Balassa, accepted bribes from Fer-
dinand I and deserted to the Imperial side. 
Balassa's defection resulted in the Habsburg occupation of Szatmar in De-
cember of 1561. Meanwhile Bathory was engaged in defending the territory 
along the Tisza and was able to recapture the fortress of Hadad, but Balassa led a 
Habsburg counterattack which defeated Bathory and another Transylvanian gen-
eral. Bathory himself was wounded in the fighting, and most of the Transylva-
nian army deserted. After the debacle many leading Transylvanians went over to 
the Habsburgs and forced John Sigismund to enter peace negotiations: He was 
willing to make concessions, but the Habsburgs deemed these insufficient. Two 
Polish ambassadors served as intermediaries so that a truce was reached while 
final negotiations dragged on. The sticking point was the districts drained by the 
Tisza River, which were mostly under Habsburg occupation5. The truce was 
supposed to last until December of 1564, but fighting broke out during the sum-
mer, with the Habsburg forces under Balassa and the Transylvanian army under 
Bathory. Bathory had entered into secret negotiations with inhabitants of Szat-
mar, who were restive under Balassa's heavy yoke. Bathory tricked Balassa's 
forces into marching north while he cut south toward the Tisza Rivers and estab-
lished contact with his partisans in Szatmar, who told him that the town was 
lightly defended. After a long night's march his troops entered the town on 3 
September and stormed the fortress, putting the German mercenaries who re-
sisted to the sword. An added prize was the capture of Balassa's wife and chil-
dren. Balassa was forced to ransom them from Bathory by surrendering three 
more fortresses6• 
These developments greatly angered the court at Vienna, now under Maxi-
milian II (1564-1576), which regarded Szatmar as the key to controlling the ter-
ritory along the Transylvanian border. The war continued as Bathory led the 
Transylvanians to conquests reaching along the Tisza all the way to Cassovia 
(Kassa, Kaschau, Kosice, today in Slovakia). Vienna reacted by recruiting a new 
5 Emeric LUKINICH, La jeunesse d'Etienne Bathory (Etienne Bathory, prince de Transylva-
nie; in. Etienne Batory, 22-28. 
Ibid., 28-30. 
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army and launching an unexpected winter campaign which caught the Transyl-
vanians unprepared. 
In January 1565 the Habsburg army recovered all that it had lost. Discour-
aged, John Sigismund sued for peace. BlHhory was one of the two representa-
tives that he sent to negotiate a preliminary treaty at Szatmar on March 13, 
which ceded most of the territory along the frontier to Maximilian. All the terri-
tories outside of Transy lvania proper were recognized as constitutive parts of the 
(Habsburg) Kingdom of Hungary and owing obedience to the Hungarian crown. 
This Convention of Szatmar was only provisional, for the final treaty was to be 
negotiated in Vienna. Again John Sigismund put BlHhory in charge of the nego-
tiations with orders to seek concessions from the extreme measures of the Szat-
mar Convention. Bathory presented his Prince's request for mitigations, but 
Maximilian refused to give up any of the gains awarded him by the Conven-
tion7• 
John Sigismund had one obvious recourse to gain concessions. He sent an 
embassy to Constantinople to enlist the support of his Turkish overlord. 
Suleiman agreed and requested that Maximilian restore the conquests of the pre-
vious winter, threatening war if the Emperor refused. John Sigismund now felt 
strong enough to disregard completely the Szatmar agreement and to demand a 
totally fresh start to negotiations. In Vienna BlHhory had just begun his efforts to 
gain mitigations of the Szatmar Convent jon when the new, uncompromising in-
structions arrived from his Prince. He presented these to the Imperial advisors on 
14 May 1565. Maximilian was to restore all his recent conquests; in return John 
Sigismund would make minor concessions. The Imperial counselors were out-
raged and considered BlHhory, not his Prince, the main sources of the fresh de-
mands. Ignoring the 'traditional rights of an ambassador, they arrested BlHhory 
on 5 June 15658. They demanded to see his instructions and he complied; they 
then demanded to see his further, secret instructions, but he had none and could 
not comply. BlHhory remained a prisoner for two years, first at Vienna, later at 
Prague. He devoted the two years to encyclopedic reading, an enjoyable pursuit 
given his scholarly bent, but he could scarcely forget these two years of unjust 
imprisonment when he became King of Poland. Both John Sigismund of Tran-
sylvania and Sigismund Augustus of Poland pleaded in vain for his release. His 
release came only in 1567 when the new Sultan, Selim II, made it a condition for 
giving a safe conduct to Imperial ambassadors who had to undertake negotia-
tions with the Porte9• 
BlHhory returned to Transylvania to find John Sigismund under the domi-
nation of his chief minister, Caspar B6k6s. BlHhory was given command of 
Varad but was excluded from influence. B6k6s was the main force behind new 
7 Ibid., 30-3l. 
8 On the immunities granted ambassadors in this period, see Garrett MATTINGLY, Renais-
sance Diplomacy (Baltimore 1964) 39-44 233-244. 
9 LUKlNICH 32-34; Antonio POSSEVlNO, Transilvania, edited by Endre VERESS (Budapest 
1913) 99 100. 
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negotiations with the Imperial government during 1570, first at Prague, then at 
Speyer. The Convention of Speyer, which regularized relations between the 
Habsburg Kingdom of Hungary and Transylvania, not only dealt with control of 
territory in the Tisza frontier region but also recognized the suzerainty of the 
King of Hungary over all of Transylvania. Indeed, the Convention seemed to re-
duce Transylvania to a province of Hungary with its Prince acting as a governor 
named by the King. Transylvanian patriots such as Bathory regarded the Treaty 
as a sellout to the Habsburgs. On 14 March 1571 John Sigismund died without 
an heir and without having submitted the Convention of Speyer to the Diet for 
approval so that technically it did not have the force of law-at least in the eyes Of 
many Transylvanians. In 1566 Sultan Suleiman had recognized the right of the 
Transylvanian Diet to elect the Prince. The Diet proceeded with the election on 
25 May 1571. There were two candidates: Bathory supported by the Sultan and 
Bekes supported by the Habsburgs. B<Hhory was elected unanimouslylO. 
In 1576 Rudolf II was elected Emperor after the death of his father, Maxim-
ilian II. There was also a new king in Poland that year. Henry Ill's return to 
France resulted in his de facto abdication of Polish throne. The election of a new 
king of Poland attracted half a dozen candidates, of whom the two most popular 
were the Habsburg Archduke Maximilian and Stephan B<Hhory, Prince of Tran-
sylvania. The election was irregular and disputed, but B<Hhory emerged as King 
of Poland-Lithuania. Four factors favored him: he enjoyed wide support among 
the anti-Habsburg nobility led by Jan Zamoyski; he promised to marry Anna 
Jagiellonka and thereby indirectly carryon an illustrious Polish dynasty; he had 
the support of the Sultan, who mobilized an army against the Emperor; and he 
marched into Krakow before the Habsburgs could react. He was both married 
and anointed King on 1 May 1576. As Prince of Transylvania Bathory was in no 
position to challenge effectively the Habsburg occupation of Szatmar or even 
demand compensation. As King of Poland he was in a much stronger position, 
but immediately after his elections there were more pressing problems than set-
tling old accounts with the Habsburgs. Danzig (Gdansk) rose in a revolt that re-
quir~d a major military operation to put down. The Khan of the Crimea and 
100,000 Tartars were raiding Ruthenia. Most important was the Livonian War. 
Since 1557 the Poles and the Swedes had been fighting parallel wars against the 
Muscovy of Ivan the Terrible fcir control of the Baltic region. Until the Livonian 
War was concluded, Bathory could not apply enough pressure to force the Impe-
rial court to reopen the Szatmar questionll . That war ended early in 1582, thanks 
in part to the efforts of a papal mediator, Antonio Possevino, who soon assumed 
a similar role in the Szatmar dispute. 
10 LUKINICH 33-35; POSSEVINO, Transilvania 105-112. 
II Norman DAVIES, God's Playground: A History of Poland (New York 1982) I 421-423; 
Louis SzADECZKY, L 'election d'Etienne Bathory au trone de Pologne, in Etienne Batory, 82-104. 
Some Poles saw Habsburg intrigue behind both the Tatar attack and the Danzig revolt: see Ed-
ward KUNTZE, Les rapports de la Pologne avec Ie Saint-Siege a I'epoque d 'Etienne Bathory, in 
Etienne Balory, 165. 
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The complex and protracted negotiations that resulted in the Peace of Jam 
Zapolski between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania (the Swedes did not partici-
pate) owed much to the papal mediator, Antonio Possevino, S.J., although the 
peace mainly resulted from mutual exhaustion12• For years the forces of Ivan IV 
the Terrible had been on the defensive. Ivan sought to cut his losses by taking 
advantage of Pope Gregory XIII's desire to forge an alliance of Christian rulers 
against the Turks and to open Russia to Catholic influence. Ivan sent a represen-
tative to Rome in early 1581 to request papal good offices in attaining peace be-
tween Muscovy and Poland, dangling before the Pope the possibility of an anti-
Turkish alliance. Gregory assigned the Jesuit Antonio Possevino to the task of 
mediator and conferred on him exceptional powers as papal nuncio and legate 
for northern and eastern Europe. Possevino held preliminary discussions with 
Bathory at Vilnius and with Ivan at Moscow before serving as honest broker in 
the peace negotiations at Jam Zapolski in December and January. The Treaty 
was concluded 15 January 158213• Stephan BMhory had reason to be satisfied 
with the considerable territorial gains made by Poland-Lithuania. The Poles had 
had the best of the fighting, but the stout Russian resistance in the epic siege of 
Pskov (1581) had dampened Polish ardor to continue the war to total victory. 
Possevino's dealings with the Polish King ripened into an unusually close 
relationship. Both were born in 1533; both had studied at the University of . 
Padua; both were steeped in humanist cultured and had encyclopedic intellectual 
interests; both conversed easily in Latin. B<ithory's exceptional confidence in 
Possevino is shown. by a letter he wrote to Gregory XIII: 
«So then we have noted singular trustworthiness in Father Possevino ... I have often 
thoroughly discussed these matters with him that I feel pertinent to the public good of the 
Christian name, so I reiterate my request that Your Holiness have complete trust in him 
about these matters»14. 
12 Possevino was born in Mantua on 12 July 1533, entered the Society at Rome 29 September 
1559, and died at Ferrara 26 February 1611. . 
13 The literature on the negotiations is extensive. See Stanislas Pou::IN, Une tentative d 'Union 
au xvr siecle: La Mission religieuse du Pere A';toine Possevin S.J. en Moscovie (1581-1582) 
(Rome 1957); Paul PIERLING, Un arbitragt; pont{fical au XVI' siecle entre Pologne et la Russie: la 
mission diplomatique de Pere Possevino, 1581-1582 (Brussels 1890); 10. La Saint-Stege, la Polo-
, gne et Moscou, 1582-1587 (Paris 1885); Liisi .KARTIUNEN, Antonio Possevino: un diplomate 
pontifical au XVI' siecle (Laussane 1908). For Possevino's own account of his mission, written for 
Gregory XIII, see Antonio POSSEVINO, The Moscovia, edited and translated by Hugh F. GRAHAM, 
(Pittsburgh 1977). A general study of peacemaking in the sixteenth century is Joycelyne G. Rus-
SELL'S Peacemaking in the Renaissance (Philadelphia 1986); for the section on the papacy's role, 
see pp. 21-47. 
14 Letter of Biithory to Gregory XIII, 27 August 1584, printed in Edward KUNTZE and Czeslaw 
NANKE, editors, Alberto Bolognetti nuntii apostolici in Polonia epistolae et acta, 1581-1585 in 
Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana (Krakow 1923-1950) VII 419, henceforward referred to as 
MPV. 
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Possevino's esteem for the King is most evident in a memorial he wrote to 
guide Martin Laterna, the King's Jesuit confessor15. ·It was to Possevino that 
BMhory entrusted the main task of negotiating a settlement of the Szatmar dis-
pute. The negotiations went on from 1582 to 1585. Several factors contributed to 
making Possevino the main facilitator of these negotiations. Crucial was the 
confidence that he enjoyed not only with Bathory but also with Gregory XIII 
and the Cardinal Secretary, Tolemeo Gallio, the Cardinal of Como. During this 
period the Polish and Imperial courts did not have regular ambassadors with 
each other. This allowed Possevino as nuncio extraordinary, who was frequently 
traveling between the two courts, to playa key role as mediator even though the 
Imperialists felt that Possevino was partial to BMhory.16 In this they were proba-
bly right, but his partiality could have had little affect on the negotiations. Pos-
sevino's task was to facilitate negotiations, suggest alternatives, and ease rancor. 
He was not a mediator in the sense of one who has the power to make a decision 
after hearing both sides. He had certainly been sympathetic to the Polish King in 
his fight against Ivan the Terrible, but he had succeeded in mediating a treaty 
both sides could accept. Any anti-Habsburg inclinations he had in these negotia-
tions were more than offset by the papacy's desire for an amicable settlement, its 
need to please the Habsburgs, and the fact that, unlike Ivan's diplomats, the Im-
perialists were dealing from a position of strength throughout the negotiations: 
they were in possession of Szatmar and its adjacent territories. BMhory could 
only plead for their restoration or for compensation. 
The negotiations studied here have been largely ignored by previous histo-
rians, perhaps because they did not lead to war and because BMhory died shortly 
after their conclusion. The World of Rudolf II: A Study in Intellectual History, 
1576-1612 by R. 1. W. Evans never refers to these negotiations17. They fall out-
side the parameters of Stanislas Polcin 's study of Possevino's mission to 
Moscow. More surprisingly, Liisi Karttunen's study of his diplomatic career 
merely alludes to the negotiations in passing18. So does Edouard Kuntze, while 
15 M. Laterna born 1552 at Drohobycz; entered Society 10 May at Braniewo; died 30 Septem-
ber 1598 in the Baltic Sea. Laszlo SZILAS, Der Hofprediger Latema, Possevino und der polnische 
Konigshof Eine Instruktion Possevinos aus dem Jahre 1583, AHSI 40 (1971) 391-422. 
16 Mon. alii. Hung. II (1580-1586) 6*, 767-768 (= LuKAcs II). 
17 (Oxford 1973). Rudolf had an inflated sense of his own grandeur and suffered had severe 
mental problems that grew worse with time and complicated negotiations: see H.C. MIDELFORT, 
Mad Princes of Renaissance Germany (Charlottesville, VA 1994) 125-134. On his stance toward 
a leagl,le against the Turks, see Friedrich von BEZOLD, Kaiser Rudolf II und die heilige riga. Ko-
ni9lich Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Abhandlungen XVII (1886) 341-384. 8 KARTTUNEN, 217 218. There is no modern full-length biography of Possevino. The only full 
biography is that of Jean DORIGNY (Paris 1712); I have used the Italian translation by Nicholas 
GHEZZI, which contains a second volume of documents not in the French edition: Vita del P. An-
tonio Possevino della Compagnia di Gesu (Venice 1759). Georg Fell included a ninety page bio-
graphy of Possevino at the beginning of his edition/translation of Possevino's De Cultura inge-
niorum (277-367) in Die Jesuiten Perpina, Bonifacius und Possevin: Ausgewiihlte piidagogische 
Schriften, edited and translated by J. STIER, H. SCHEID, and G. FELL (Freiburg im Breisgau 1901). 
Neither of these works deals with the Szatmar negotiations. 
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Ladislaus Lukacs devotes a paragraph to the Szatmar negotiations19. Ludwig 
von Pastor gives them only two sentences20. The most detailed discussion, by 
Roderich Gooss, runs only six pages21 . All the same, the negotiations have left 
an abundance of archival materiaf2. The greatest part of this documentation is 
the correspondence of Possevino. Possevino also incorporated a summary of the 
first two years of the negotiations into his Transilvania, which he wrote for Gre-
gory xm23. Hundreds of documents relating to the negotiations have been 
printed, but in a variety of different works24. 
19 Kuntze, Les rapports, 158, 166; LuKAcs, 15*-16*. The Szatmar negotiations are not treated 
either in Andrea PONTECORVO MARTONFFY'S dissertation, The Early Counter-Reformation in 
Hungary, Jesuits, Papal Nuncios, and the Hungarian Lands, 1550-1606, University of Chicago, 
1980, or in Tamas SZAB6 's thesis, Antonio Possevinos Bemilhungen um die Erneuerung des Ka-
tholizismus in Siebenbiirgen, Rome, Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1990. 
20 The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages, trans. R.F. KERR (St. Louis 
1930) XJ( 444. . 
21 Roderich Gooss, editor, Osterreichische Staatsvertriige: Fiirstentum Siebenbiirgen (1526-
1690), (Vienna 1911) 204-210. 
22 Archivum secretum vaticanum (ASV), Nunz. Germ. 9394 and 95; Nunz. Pol. 15C, 17A; 
Nunz. Pol. Ad II. 2. Also very rich for the negotiations are Antonio Possevino's papers in ARSI 
Opp. NN. 317 3291 and II, 330. Possevino had his secretary, Thomas Sailly, SJ ., compile annual 
letters of his diplomatic activity which often contain details of his negotiations. That dated 28 
May 1582 covers 1581 and is found in two copies in ASV Nunz. Pol. 17A 64-72 and 85-94. The 
annual letters for 1582 and 1583 are in ASV Nunz. Pol. 17A 133-170 and are partially printed in 
LuKAcs II, 519-540. The annual letter for 1584 is ARSI Germ. 165 168-172. Possevino wrote a 
detailed account of his prolonged negotiations, 13 June to 10 September 1583, at the Diet of Im-
perial Hungary held at Cassovia; this can be found in ASV Nunz. Pol. 17A 106-132 but I have 
used the copy in ARSI Opp. NN. 317112-134; this whole folder contains copies of documents 8-
176, dealing with the SZfltmar negotiations. It has been largely overlooked, except by Lukacs. It 
seems that not many records of the Emperor 's role in the negotiations have survived: «Rudolf is 
scantily represented» in the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, and the only printed collection 
of Rudolf's correspondence covers the years 1589 to 1592: EVANS, 43 . 
23 Antonio POSSEVINO, Transilvania, edited by Endre VERESS, (Budapest 1913) 149-172. This 
edition is of the Transilvania is used throughout this essay. There is a later edition printed in Gia-
como BASCAPE'S La Relazione fra I'ltalia e la Transilvania (Rome 1931). POSSEVINO'S Transil-
vania provides the most comprehensive account of the first three years of the negotiations. Gre-
gory XIII found the Transilvania so interesting that he read through it in a few days. It is worth 
noting that when the Cardinal Secretary returned the manuscript of Possevino's Transilvania to 
the Jesuit General Claudio Acquaviva, it came with instructions to delete most of the account of 
the Szatmar negotiations before publication. Ibid., XII XJ(I-XXII. In fact Acquaviva decided not 
to permit publication of the Transilvania so that the manuscript did not see print until 1913. On 
the criticisms of the Jesuit censors against the Transilvania , see LuKAcs II, 953-958. The Jesuit 
censors also requested the revision or deletion of the material on the negotiations: ibid., 954 958. 
In contrast, Ludwig von Pastor speaks thus of th'e Transilvania: «The far-reaching and generous 
spirit in which the zealous Jesuit drew out his arguments was in complete accordance with the 
character and ideas of the aged Pope». XJ( 642. . 
24 The most copious printed source for documents and correspondence on the Szatmar negotia-
tions is the Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana, Tomus V-VII, covering 1581-1585. Less valuable is 
J6zef SIEMIENSKl, editor, Archiwum lana Zamoyskiego, kanclerza i hetmana wielkiego koron-
nego (Warsaw 1913) III (1582-1584). The reports of the Venetian ambassadors to the Imperial 
court are printed in M6r KARpATHY-KRAVJJ\NSZKY, Rudolf uralkodtistinak elsa tiz eve (1576-
1586). A Velencei Kir. AI/ami Levelttir cstiszari udvarbOl val6 kovetjelentesei alapjtin [The First 
Ten Years of the Reign of Rudolf (1576-1586) on the Basis of Reports by Ambassadors from the 
Imperial Court Taken from the Royal State Archives of Venice] (Budapest 1933). More than half 
of these reports deal with the Szatmar negotiations and suggest that the Venetian government fol-
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The interest of the Holy See in promoting an understanding between 
Rudolf and BMhory had multiple and somewhat contra'ctictory motives. One was 
the purely religious goal of promoting peace, especially peace between Christian 
monarchs. Again and again wars between Catholic kings, most notably the Hab-
sburg-Valois Wars, had weakened Catholic efforts to stem the Protestant tide 
during the sixteenth century. Protestant congregations were widespread in the 
lands of both Rudolf II and Stephan BMhory, but they did not constitute a mili-
tary threat. For BMhory and the Poles the main threat was Ivan the Terrible. For 
Rudolf the Hungarian frontier with the Turks was always in jeopardy, and we 
have already noted how Bathory was able to use his status as a client of the Sul-
tan for his Transylvanian lands to put pressure on the Habsburgs. 
Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry for control of the Danube basin and the Balkans 
was to endure for three hundred years, but during the early years of Rudolf's 
reign there was little active fighting. Rudolf was less personally interested in the 
art of war than in the mannerist paintings of Bartholomew Spranger and 
Giuseppe Arcimboldo. He was so fascinated by astrology that in the crucial year 
1588 he refused to see the Spanish ambassador for weeks on end25 . In 1576, the 
first year of Rudolf's reign, Turkish expansion began to gravitate toward Iran 
and the Caspian and away from Hungary and the Mediterranean and resulted in 
twelve years war of between the Turks and the Iranians and a treaty (21 March 
1590) which gave the Sultan control of most of the Caucasus region. After a 
brief interlude while the Turks put down internal revolts full scale war broke out 
between the Ottomans and Rudolf along the Hungarian border from 1593 to 
160626• 
The policy of Gregory XIII in trying to unite Catholic monarchs against Is-
lam is part of long-standing papal policy going back to the First Crusade. The 
call to crusade and to jihad could still stir many hearts in the sixteenth century. 
Gregory XIII, more than any pontiff of the century, had a personal interest in the 
Levant and in the Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire. Close to 
his heart was the goal of renewing the alliance against the Turks forged by his 
predecessor Pius V and crowned with victory at Lepanto. But Venice, ever fear-
ful for her trade and her possessions on Crete and on the Ionian islands, had de-
lowed them with considerable interest. These reports have an added value because they tend to re-
flect the Imperial viewpoint and thereby compensate for the preponderance of Possevino's corre-
spondence in the source material used here, which better represents Polish and papal concerns. 
Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae, edited by L. LuKAcs and cited earlier, prints a number of docu-
ments which touch on the negotiations. A few documents on the negotiations are found in two 
works by Paul PIERLING: Bathory et Possevino: Documents inl?dits sur les rapports du Saint-
Siege avec les Slaves (Paris 1887) and Le Saint-Siege, la Pologne et Moscou, 1582-1587 (Paris 
1885). Of marginal value for this topic is Augustinus Theiner'sAnnales ecclesiastici quos post ... 
Baronium .. . (Rome 1856), but see III 342 351 352 448 for relevant documents. 
25 Garrett MATTINGLY, The Armada (Boston 1950) 179. 
26 Femand BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 
translated by Sian Reynolds (New York 1973) II 1166-11741196-1204. Useful for background is 
Win fried SCHULZE, Reich und Turkengefahr im spaten 16. lahrhundert: Studien zu den politi-
schen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer auj3eren Bedrohung (Munich 1978). 
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serted the Holy League of Pius V shortly after Lepanto. Philip II had shifted 
Spanish priorities from fighting the Turks in the Mediterranean to putting down 
the revolt in the Netherlands. 
The popes of the late sixteenth century sought to build a new Christian al-
liance in eastern Europe. Ideally such an alliance would embrace Rudolf, 
Stephan Bathory and the Venetians. The Venetians remained rightly skeptical of 
such schemes, but a secure alliance between Rudolf and BMhory might still per-
suade the Venetians to reconside~7 . The ultimate goal of Possevino's 1581 mis-
sion to Moscow had been to win Ivan the Terrible for the Grand Alliance, but 
once Ivan had ended his war with the Poles, he gradually lost interest in a cru-
sade against the Turks despite papal efforts to encourage him28. That made an 
understanding between Rudolf and Stephan BMhory even more crucial to papal 
plans. Rudolf was the most unmartial of monarchs, but BMhory was a proven 
soldier who cut a figure of heroic proportions in both Poland and Transylvania. 
One hero king would be enough for a crusade29• As the focal point of BMhory's 
many grievances against the Habsburgs, Szatmar became the hinge of papal pro-
jects for a Grand Alliance against the Turks3o. 
1582: BATHORY DEMANDS HIS LANDS BACK 
In January 1581 the long Livonian War ended'f~oland. In April and May 
Antonio Possevino had two private conversations in R1grand Vilnius with the 
King; the second lasted for four hours. On May 27 Possevino reported from 
27 On 12 August 1582 Possevino gave a long, wide-ranging discouse presenting papal plans 
for the alliance alia signoria di Venezia in collegio and urging the Venetians to join the alliance. It 
is printed in Paul PIERLiNG, Bathory et Possevino, 168-192. I have not been able to use Ludwik 
BORATYNSKI 'S Stefan Batory i plan Ligi przeciw Turkom 1576-1584 (Krakow 1903). Von Pastor 
(XIX 329) notes, «The thought of the league [against the Turks I runs like a scarlet thread throu-
ghout the pontificate of Gregory XIII, and to a great extent determined his attitude toward the 
Christian powers». 
28 Possevino continued through 1582 to urge Ivan IV to join a crusade against the Turks, for 
instance by writing a long memorandum to the Czar entitled, De Foedere cum Serenissimo magno 
Duce inter Christianos Principes adverslls Turcam sarciendo: Ac quodammodo id maxima cum 
laude, et merito, atqlle Regnorum suorum propagatione Magnus Dux conseqlli poterit. ASV 
Nunz. Germ. 93298-302. As late as 29 September 1582 the Venetian ambassador at Rome, Leo-
nardo Donado, was reporting specific plans for an anti-Turkish alliance between Ivan and Ba-
thory. The Pope, Philip II, and Venice were to subvent the effort with 60,000 ducats for Bathory 
and 20,000 ducats for Ivan. The immediate target would be the Tartars, who were allied with the 
Turks and provided cavalry for the Turks' on-going war with Persia. Moreover the Tartars had re-
cently ravaged both Polish and Muscovite territories. Donado saw Possevino as the main promo-
tor of the alliance: see PIERLING, Bathory et Possevino, 227-231. 
29 Norman Davies entitles his chapter on this period of Polish history «Bathory: The Transyl-
vanian Victor (1576-1586»>, I, 421-432. 
30 An overview of papal policy in eastern Europe with emphasis on Possevino's role is presen-
ted in the two articles by Domenico CACCAMO, Conversione deWIslam e conqllista della Mosco-
via neWattivita diplomatica et letteraria diAntonio Possevino in Venezia e Ungheria nel Rinasci-
mento, Vittorio BRANCA editor, (Florence 1973) 167-191, and La diplomazia della Controri-
forma e la crociata: dei piani del Possevino alia 'illnga guerra' di Clemente Vlll, Archivio sto-
rico italiano, 128 (1971) 255-281. Papal policy toward the Turks in the middle years of the si-
xteenth century (1551-1571) leading up to Lepanto has been exhaustively studied by Kenneth 
SEllON, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), IV, The Sixteenth Century from Julius to PillS 
V (Philadelphia 1984). 
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Warsaw to Gallio, the Cardinal Secretary, on these conversations31. The letter 
touched many points: thus the King thanked the Pope for help in ending the 
Livonian War. But the main focus was his intention to demand that Rudolf II re-
turn his Szatmar possessions. «The King began to speak to me with great 
earnestness that he wanted to communicate to me a matter of great importance ... 
so I could represent his wishes to His Holiness, the Emperor and to Christian 
princes». Should events result in war, this should not come as a surprise «to 
Christian princes, especially to His Holiness». There must be appropriate pre-
liminary negotiations32. At this point Possevino broke in and said that he thought 
the King had the Emperor in mind, judging from their previous conversation in 
Riga. BMhory admitted this, recounting the offenses that Maximilian II had 
committed against him. He also noted the scant respect paid his ambassadors by 
Rudolf, so much that he regretted having sent them, even though he had sought 
genuine friendship with the Emperor. He was resolved to send an even more 
splendid embassy to demand back his property, but he did not want to do so 
without recourse to His Holiness, the princes of the Empire and other Christian 
p~inces. Possevino asked him to hold back until he had consulted with the Pope, 
whom God would use to enlighten him on what he should do. «He would find 
that things that appear impossible to human thinking turn out easy when men do 
their shopping with God». Reaching peace with Muscovy had been far harder 
and more profitable than would be reaching an understanding with the Emperor. 
Possevino counselled the King to postpone sending an impressive embassy to 
Rudolf and to wait and see what the Pope could do by using his paternal dili-
gence with the Emperor. Better to prepare the ground quietly, for grand em-
bassies touch off rumors, and if they fail, they could make the King «more obli-
gated to resentment and to taking action». If he got bogged down in such an en-
terprise, somebody might attack him in Livonia, and he would not have the 
power to check the Sultan, who could take advantage of a quarrel between 
. Bathory and Rudolf to increase his domain, as had happened in the past. Pos-
sevino went on to encourage the King to tell him how the situation could be re-
paired either with money or with some other sort of recompense or any other un-
foreseen way so that God could quietly direct the mind of the Emperor33. 
31 MPV V, 352-360. Possevino also describes these conversations in his Transilvania, 150; he 
says «he sensed the odor of a war of great importance for Christendom» in Bathory's words. It is 
appropriate to note here the languages used in the discussions and correspondence. The papal di-
plomats used Italian among themselves, except for formal documents, which were in Latin. Pos-
sevino used Latin in dealing with Jan Zamoyski, the Polish Grand Chancellor, and with King Ste-
phan Bathory, whose native language was Hungarian. He usually used Latin with the Emperor' s 
advisors, but Spanish when dealing with Rudolf II himself who had spent much of his youth in 
Spain and preferred to speak that language (see EVANS, 48-50; MPV VI, 264). Most of Possevi-
no 's correspondence with the Imperial court was in Latin, but he wrote at least one letter to Ru-
dolf in Spanish : see ASV Nunz. Pol. 15C 180-181, undated. 
32 MPV V, 353-355. 
33 Ibid., 355-356; POSSEVINO, Transilvania , 150-153. Bathory had tried to bring up the Szat-
mar question with the Emperor earlier, in 1578 and 1579, but his bargaining position then, before 
the successful conclusion of the Livonian War, was far less strong. POSSEVlNO'S Transilvania , 
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BMhory acknowledged that the price of the land, which would constitute a 
medium-sized duchy in Italy, would be easy to calculate but that he was com-
pletely opposed to selling his patrimonial inheritance for money because that in-
volved dishonor, but to Possevino BMhory seemed less opposed to an exchange 
of territory. The real reason he wanted back his own lands was the way Maximil-
ian had seized and held them, «per notam infidelitatis» in the J(jng 's own words. 
This weighed on him, and when his subjects urged him to recover the lands, they 
pointed out that if he did not do so now that he was a king, he could never do so. 
He was being forced to attempt their recovery. The J(jng closed the conversation 
by agreeing to confer first with the Pope and by giving Possevino the task, «also 
leaving me free to deal privately with the Emperor, and so he wrote in my papers 
of credence» to the Pope34. 
On May 14 BMhory had a third discussion with Possevino about relations 
with the Emperor. He raised a new issue: the Emperor had notified two Polish 
cities, Danzig and Elbl~g (Elbing), about the forthcoming Imperial Diet, ad-
dressing them as if they were his subjects. BMhory was indignant-what if he did 
the same as regards Prague or Vienna! Possevino tried to calm him, pointing to 
the pacific nature of Rudolf, and how Christendom would suffer if the two 
monarchs were to give an opening to the Turks. The J(jng then told Possevino 
that the reason why he had discussed the whole problem with him was because 
rumors were floating throughout Germany that he wanted to invade Hun-
gary-rumors started by the Imperial court. He asked Possevino to tell the Pope 
not only about their discussions but that «he did not want to be the first to stir up 
tumults among Christians»35. 
Was the Szatmar dispute really likely to lead to war? The conversations 
with Possevino clearly suggested that BMhory did not rule out military action 
against the Emperor', and BMhory claimed that he could raise 30,000 cavalry and 
10,000 infantry in Transylvania to back his complaints against the Empero~6. 
But there is strong evidence that BMhory was more likely to threaten war than 
actually start one. He later told Possevino that he never intended to go to war 
over the Szatmar question37. In the years treated here BMhory was no longer 
technically the ruler of Transylvania, having surrendered the title of Prince of 
149-158, and Opp. NN. 31711-13, review these early negotiations, which dealt not only with the 
Szatmar question but eleven other sources of friction between the two monarchs. On the linkage 
between the end of the Livonian War and the reopening of the Szatmar question, see ibid., 158 
159. . 
34 Ibid. , 153; MPV V, 356. 
35 Ibid., 357. 
36 KUNTZE, Les rapports, 164. 
37 MPV VII, 437, Possevino to Cardinal Gallio, 29 April 1584. On 20 January 1583 Alberto 
Bolognetti, the regular nuncio to the Polish court, wrote to Cardinal Guastavillani, the nephew of 
Gregory XIII, an enormous and bitter letter (MPV VI, 32-57) denouncing Possevino for his role 
in the Szatmar negotiations and for much else. Bolognetti was an able diplomat and officially 
maintained cordial relations with Possevino but harbored an intense hatred for him which he re-
vealed only in confidential letters to his brother and to his friend Guastavillani. Bolognetti accu-
sed Possevino of greatly exaggerating the danger of war between the two monarchs in his ac-
counts to Gregory XIII and of working for the recall of the special Polish ambassador Hiero-
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Transylvania to his brother Christopher after his own election to the Polish 
throne. When Christopher died in 1581, the title went 'to Christopher's son Sigis-
mund. But BMhory effectively ruled Transylvania in his young nephew's 
name38. The weakness of the Polish Kingship also made war less likely since the 
powerful Polish nobility were unlikely to support a major war either to defend 
their King's honor or to gain minor territories for the child-prince of Transylva-
nia. Without widespread support among the nobility, war with the Emperor 
would have been folly, and BMhory was no fool. Moreover, BMhory had poten-
tial enemies in Moscow and Constantinople who took priority over his personal 
grievances with the Habsburg. The threat of war raised by Bathory seems largely 
a bargaining chip, but many wars have been fought over royal honor and a 
shorter list of injuries than BMhory 's. 
After discussing the conversations with Jan Zamoyski, the Polish Grand 
Chancellor, and with Alberto Bolognetti, the regular nuncio to the Polish court, 
Possevino decided to go to Prague to discuss issues with the Emperor, probably 
after preliminary talks with the Imperial Counselors39• 
By April 10 Alberto Badoer, the Venetian ambassador at Vienna, was re-
porting the forthcoming arrival of a Polish envoy who would ask for the return 
Szatmar, Tochay, and Nemethy. The new Venetian Ambassador, Girolamo Lip-
pomano, stopped at Trent on his way to the Imperial court and there conferred 
with Cardinal Ludovico Madruzzo, who was about to depart as legate to the 
forthcoming Diet at Augsburg. He reported the same news as Badoer, but added 
that the Emperor felt that his father had rightfully taken these lands in war and 
that subsequently heavy investments had been devoted to fortifying them. These 
were arguments that would surface again and again40. 
nymus RozdraZewski so that he could monopolize the negotiations himself (Ibid., 39). According 
to Bolognetti, Possevino was also trying to squeeze both the regular nuncios, himself and Bonomi 
at the Imperial court, out of the Szatmar negotiations. Thoughts of war were far from Bathory's 
mind, and Possevino's meddling was dangerous. Ibid., 34-39. Specifically, Bolognetti felt that the 
account of Possevino's conversations with the King which Possevino sent to Cardinal Gallio on 
27 May 1582 had exaggerated the danger of war: « .. .il Re, che pochi giomi dapoi si mettesse in 
camino per Cracovia, mi parlo in questa materia molto allotigo, non mi parve di comprendere 
dalle sue parole tanto pericolo di rottura contro l'Imperatore, quando haveva impresso il Padre 
nell ' animo di N.S. [Gallio) ... » Ibid., 36. For similar letters revealing Bolognetti's hatred for Pos-
sevino, see MPV VI, 140-151 396-399; VII, 749-769. 
38 Jacob Wujek [Born 1540 at W~growiec, Poland; entered Society 25 July 1567 at Rome; died 
27 July 1597 at Krakow), the Jesuit rector at Cluj, reported to the Jesuit General Claudio Acqua-
viva, on 18 August 1581, shortly after Christopher's death: «Transylvania fere ex praescripto Re-
gis Poloniae gubematur nunc et deinceps etiam gubemabitur. Tutor ipse est pueri Principis». Lu-
KAcs II, 161. 
39 Ibid., 357. For Bolognetti, see Dizionario biografico degli Italiani (Rome 1969) XI, 313-
316. Pope Gregory XIII named Bolognetti cardinal on 11 December 1583 during his involvement 
in the negotiations. . ' 
40 KARpATHy-KRAvJANsZKY, 159. Badoer 's dispatch is dated April 10, Lippomano's is April 
22. 
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On June 18 Possevino sent two reports back to Poland, a short one to Jan 
Zamoyski41 and a longer one to the King42. He reported on his discussions with 
the Emperor's counselors43. Rudolf himself had already departed for the forth-
coming Diet at Augsburg, so Possevino had taken the opportunity to discuss the 
King 's demands with the Emperor's advisors at Prague, who claimed that Maxi-
milian had rightfully captured the territories in war and therefore had done no in-
jury to the BMhory family. BMhory 's unjust imprisonment was Maximilian's 
doing, but he was dead, and Rudolf had never done BMhory any harm. There 
was no basis for Polish suspicions that Rudolf had been intriguing with Ivan the 
Terrible44. His counselors claimed that as far as possible Rudolf had been striv-
ing to renew a treaty of friendship with Poland. If things were handled properly, 
he would not fail to do everything desired of him so that the public need of the 
two realms would be put before mere private interests. If necessary, private 
questions too could be dealt with at the proper time as long as they did not inter-
fere with the greater good. They also made excuses for the Emperor's letter to 
Danzig and Elblag45 . 
Just before departing from Prague on June 19 Possevino wrote BMhory and 
asked how he should respond if the same arguments were brought up at Augs-
burg by the Emperor. He reached Augsburg on June 25. The next day he con-
ferred with Gian Francesco Bonomi, the nuncio to Rudolf, and with Cardinal 
Ludovico Madruzzo, the special legate to the Diet46. Reporting to Cardinal Gal-
lio on July 20, Possevino described a preliminary conference with three of 
Rudolf's closest advisors, Johannes Trautson, Adam Dietrichstein, and Wolf-
gang Rumf, before having «a very long and congenial audience» with Rudolf 
himself in which Possevino recounted his dealings with Muscovy and discussed 
the Szatmar question. ,The Emperor promised to deal with the question, calling it 
«a most important matter for the good of Christendom» 47. Rudolf also welcomed 
the role of the Pope in seeking a resolution48. 
41 MPV V, 384-385. 
42 Ibid., 382-384. 
43 He does not name them, but they were probably Wolfgang Rumf, the Imperial Counselor, 
and Vratislav Pernstein, the Chancellor of Bohemia: ibid., 357, 384. 
44 It is worth noting a report of Lippomano to the Doge (1 September 1582) that the Imperial 
counselors had little praise for Possevino's role in mediating the peace between Muscovy and Po-
land. KARpATHy-KRAvJANszKY, 503. 
45 MPV V, 383, 384. • 
46 MPV V, 392, n. 2. The considerable success of Madruzzo's mission is discussed by von PA-
STOR XX, 269-283. For Bonomi (also Bonhomini), see Dizionario biografico degli Italiani 
(Rome 1970) XII, 309-314. 
47 MPV V, 398. 
48 Ibid., Rudolf (regarding the Pope) « •• • non solo sa gli uffici paterni fatti in questo negotio, 
rna ne porta grata memoria, non senza speranza che S. Bne sia per promuoverlo a fine ... » Ibid., 
Later (21 September 1582) Possevino wrote to the Polish Ambassador in Rome, Peter Dunin 
Wolski, « ... mihi Caes. Mtas mandasset suo que signo Caesareo Consilii Caesarei responsum mu-
niisset et litteras quoque manu propria scriptas ad eius S[anctita]tem dedisset, ad eius Stem qui-
dem veni, ut totam rem afferem». Possevino went on to say how he had written Bathory about 
how hopeful he was after his interview with Rudolf: «ut possit Regia Mtas intelligere me maio-
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The Emperor responded to Bcithoryin a decree issued at Augsburg on July 
13 in which he asserted his desire to renew the treaty of friendship with Poland 
and invited Bathory to send a delegation to work out details. He rejected, how-
ever, Bcithory's claims to the Szatmar territories (<<the King could have no 
proper cause for requesting those same territories»), but if the Pope could make 
some proposals so that the affair could be settled, the Pope and all others would 
realize how eager the Emperor was to secure peace. If Bathory were to pledge to 
put the on-going negotiations for the friendship treaty ahead of this private mat-
ter, then Rudolf promised to do his part49 . 
On July 13 the Emperor gave Possevino a rescript developing the familiar 
arguments for rejecting Bathory's claims. When Maximilian II had conquered 
the territories, he was making war against a prince who was allied with the Turk-
ish enemies of the faith. Since then Szatmar had been radically transformed and 
fortified at very great expense. Moreover Prince Sigismund had explicitly sur-
rendered the territories to Maximilian at Speyer in 15705°. The Emperor, in 
short, was rejecting Bcithory's claims to Szatmar while leaving open the possi-
bility of concessions and linking the affair to the treaty of peace and friendship 
that both desired. 
On July 7, even before Posse vi no met the Emperor, Bathory had written to 
Peter Dunin Wolski, his ambasssador in Rome, giving him background on the 
controversy and instructing him to line up support among the cardinals and to 
assure the Pope that he did not so much want the Pope to intercede for him with 
the Emperor as to recognize the merits of his cause5l . On July 28 Lippomano re-
ported from Augsburg news that at Warsaw Bcithory was speaking rather openly 
about his desire for the fortresses or at least for compensation, otherwise there 
might be war (<<si fara poi egli ragione con l'arme»). There was talk of summon-
ing a Polish Diet in September, which would discuss not only the Szatmar ques-
tion but also Polish claims in Silesia and Moravia. Lippomano asked his masters 
to keep this information secret. But he held out the hope that if Bcithory was in-
clined to accept a reasonable solution, the Pope would be doing a service by 
proposing a compromise, for Rudolf was making public how much he wanted 
peace52. 
In response to Rudolf's invitation that he send a more formal embassy, 
Bathory decided in August not to wait for a response from Rome, whither Pos-
rem aliquam spem de hoc negotio concepisse, quam revera antea conceperam ... » MPV V" 
504. 
49 MPV V, 406-407. This document is not to be confused with the one mentioned in the next 
note, also issued by Rudolf II on 13 July 1582 and dealing with the Szatmar question. 
50 Siemienski prints most of the rescript, 424 425. For the complete document, see ASV Nunz. 
Pol. 17A 60-61. Lippomano reported the same details to the Venetian government on July 20 and 
again in still more detail on July 28: KARpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 160 161. Lippomano's source for 
this information was probably Possevino, who was providing him with a steady stream of infor-
mation about the negotiations: ibid., 160 168 180; MPV V, 547 590; VI, 267n 275n. 
51 MPV V, 399 .400. 
52 MPV V, 162. «Havendo Sua M-ta voluto, che tullo questo sia risposto gratiossamente al 
predello Don Antonio Possevino, rendendosi certa, che essendo referita questa sua sinciera vo-
lonta al Summo Pont-ce, S. S-ta non sia per mancare con ogni studio, industria et destreiza di re-
18 JOHN PATRICK DONNELLY, SJ. 
sevino had gone after finishing his negotiations at Augsburg. He appointed a 
special ambassador to the Imperial Diet. His choice was Bishop Hieronymus 
RozdraZewski, who did not reach Augsburg until September 18, after the Diet 
had closed and many of the princes had returned home53. Both Bonomi and Lip-
pomano reported that he quickly made a bad impression on the Emperor and his 
advisors. According to the nuncio Bonomi, one reason for the hostility toward 
RozdraZewski was that his role seemed to conflict with the impression given by 
BMhory to Possevino that BMhory wanted the Pope to serve as a mediatof4. 
RozdraZewski's harshness seemed a counterpoise to the more supple, less con-
frontational style of Possevino. BMhory may have intended the contrasting 
styles of the two negotiators. What is today called the good coplbad cop tech-
nique has a long history. Possevino 's proposals may have seemed more accept-
able to the Imperialists precisely because they contrasted with the style and 
statements of Rozdrazewski. 
On September 22 Gregory XIII wrote Stephan BMhory, telling how Pos-
sevin a had described for him the differences between the two monarchs. He was 
«incredibly troubled» and desirous that his sons be united in supreme charity. 
The best solution was for the papacy to take the matter in hand. He exhorted the 
King to allow friendly negotiations and put aside other ways of handling the 
conflict and promised to send Possevino or a substitute to carryon negotia-
tions55. 
Also on September 22 Cardinal Gallio sent a copy of the Pope 's letter to 
Alberto Bolognetti, the Polish nuncio, and explained to him the course of the ne-
gotiations. Gallio stressed the Pope's concern that the negotiations go forward 
without igniting a new fire in Christendom. The nuncio was to urge that Biithory 
put aside any thought of settling the controversy by arms and be content to turn 
negotiations over to the Holy See acting through Possevino or some other papal 
representative.56 Two days later Possevino wrote to BMhory and expressed opti-' 
mism about the negotiations as a result of his audience with Rudolf at Augsburg. 
He gently reproved the King for seeming too pessimistic, especially now that the 
durre il negotio a que I fine , che sia piu giovevole all Rep-ca Christiana. Nel resto S.M. offerisce 
sempre al detto Possevino la sua gratia et favor Cesareo». Ibid. 
53 MPV V, 409502503. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 163. The documents frequently refer to 
Rozdrazewski by his diocese, Cuiaviensis (Vladislaviensis). 
54 MPV V, 502 503. Lippomano reported of Rozdrazewski, «Onde Cesare vede mal volontieri 
venir questo huomo, non tanto per Ie trattatione che porta, che si potrebbe pure accomodare con 
persone ragionevoli et di buona mente, quanto per la natura sua moHo rigid a et per l'animo male 
affetto verso di lui, et suoi predecessori». KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 163. POSSEVINO, Transilva-
nia, 159, says of Rozdrazewski' s efforts, <d principi dell'imperio non recevevano per bene quella 
le~atione, come annunciatrice piutosto di guerra, che di pace» 
5 MPV V, 502: «voler rirnetter tal controversia all arbitrio di N. Sre». In fact Possevino and 
Rozdrazewski were old friends, who had known each other not only in Poland and Lithuania, but 
also during Possevino's decade in France, 1562-1572: ASV Nunz. Pol. 17A 142v. 
56 MPV V, 505 506. On September 8 Lippomano reported the arrival of a letter from the Pope 
to the Emperor promising «d'interporsi moHo volontieri, et esser per fare ogni ufficio, accioche 
restino accomodate Ie differenze della Maesta Sua col Polacco; il che esseguira subito che habbia 
inteso ogni particolare dal Padre Possevino». KARpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 164. 
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Pope's paternal care for all parties had come into play. Possevino insisted on 
Rudolf's basic good will toward B<Hhory but expressed fears that Rozdrazews-
ki's mission, undertaken before B<Hhory had been informed of the Emperor' s at-
titude, might hurt chances for an equitable settlement57. The negotiations were 
now on a different and more difficult basis than in the beginning because the 
Emperor could be playing Possevino off against Rozdrazewski (<<gleefully tak-
ing advantage of the two working at odds with each other»). Possevino went on 
to suggest a reason for ending Rozdrazewski's mission-it resulted from the re-
cent meeting of the Polish Senate, but the Szatmar question pertained to Transyl-
vania, not to Poland58. His plea was largely successful, for the King wrote Roz-
drazewski on December 6 that since the the Pope had taken up the matter, Roz-
drazewski's only remaining task regarding the Szatmar negotiations would be to 
urge the Emperor to a quick response59. 
On October 1 the Pope had written Bathory with high praise for Possevino 
and told the King that «you may have the same trust in him as you have in us 
personally»6o. The mood in Vienna, however, was anything but optimistic. The 
various ambassadors there watched the unfolding negotiations with apprehen-
sion. The ambassador from Ferrara, Valentino Florio, reported back to Alfonso 
II on October 30 that a rupture was likely since B<Hhory's demand for the 
fortresses meant that the Emperor would have to give up extensive lands and put 
in danger not only his Hungarian mines but the whole country61. Meanwhile 
Lippomano reported to Venice information that he had picked up from an Italian 
nobleman returning from Poland, who had told him that the nobility at the Polish 
court were calling for war against the Emperor, and that Adam Dietrichstein, an 
advisor to Rudolf, had described to him how B<Hhory had gathered a fund of 
. 600,000 ducats plus jewels to recover the Szatmar land~ «sooner than people 
think»62. Rozdrazewski meanwhile was chafing over the chronic procrastination 
for which Rudolf was notorious63. He was tired, wanted to break off negotiations 
and go home, convinced that the Emperor was unlikely to restore Szatmar or to 
give equivalent compensation64. 
Possevino reached Vienna on November 15 and had brief meetings with 
Rudolf and his advisors and with Rozdrazewski before hastening on to Poland. 
57 MPV V, 507 509. Possevino' s initiative in getting the papacy to serve as mediator is made 
clear in a letter (15 September 1582) of Gallio to Cardinal Madruzzo: ibid., 508. On the same day 
as Gallio' s letter to Bolognetti, rumors were floating in Vienna that Rozdrazewski 's demands for 
the return of Szatmar were being backed up by the Turks: KARpATHy-KRAvJANsZKY, 165. 
58 MPV V, 509 510. 
59 MPV V, 591. 
60 Ibid., 511. The Pope also stated, «Nihil autem opus esse intelligimus, eius fidem commen-
dari, cui us sinceritatem, prudentiam, doctrinam, Dei Gloriae tuaeque dignitatis et laudis studium 
inexhaustum cognitum tibi esse certo scimus» . Ibid. 
61 MPV V, 545 . 
62 Ibid. , 546. Reports dated 2 and 9 November 1582. 
63 EVANS, 64. Rudolf's tendancy to procrastinate contrastes with the decisive style of Bathory, 
«a cui ogni dilatione era lunga». POSSEVINO, Transiivania, 159. 
64 MPV V, 545 . Also KARpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 167 168. 
20 JOHN PATRICK DONNELLY, S.l. 
The Emperor indicated a willingness to give Bathory some recompense in Hun-
gary consistent with his own dignity and consonant with his desire for BMhory's 
friendship65 . The next day Lippomano reported to Venice that he had dined with 
Possevino at the Jesuit college and that a peaceful solution was likely because 
Rudolf would offer Bathory territorial ' compensation66 . On November 22 the 
Emperor issued a decree which promised to make compensation. Rozdrazewski 
quickly insisted that the compensation be of equal value with the Szatmar lands 
and that the negotiations for a renewal of the friendship treaty between Poland 
and the Emperor be linked with the determination of compensation. The Em-
peror agreed to this, but noted the need for more information. The documents on 
these points were forwarded to Possevino in Poland67. 
In Warsaw things looked less bright. On or about November 18 the King 
sent almost identical memoranda to the nuncio Alberto Bolognetti in Warsaw 
and to Rozdrazewski in Vienna in response to Possevino's letter from Rome 
which had indicated Rudolf's willingness to provide compensation for the occu-
pation of the Szatmar territories. The King curtly rejected Rudolf's claim that 
the fortresses were legitimate military conquests-rather they were taken over by 
the Habsburgs as a direct result of Melchior Balassa's treason at a time when 
there was not even a threat of war. BMhory accordingly refused to accept either 
the loss of the land itself or of its income. He claimed that the cost of fortifying 
Szatmar had been modest and that its return to his possession would not denude 
Habsburg Hungary of its defenses. He likewise rejected arguments based on the 
Convention of Speyer but did accept papal mediation looking toward a peaceful 
solution68. 
Perhaps more alarming was a long discussion the King had with the nuncio 
Alberto Bolognetti at this time69• The King indicated his acceptance of papal 
mediation. When the subject of the decree on Szatmar that Rudolf had given 
Possevino came up, Bolognetti tried to stress the Emperor's good will, but 
Bathory went into a detailed recital of the whole history of the affair from his 
perspective, stressing that the lands had not been taken from the King of Tran-
sylvania but «from himself and from his family» even though he had committed 
no crime against the House of Austria. He therefore had been despoiled of his 
personal possessions even though he had remained neutral in the quarrel be-
tween Emperor Ferdinand and John Zapolya. BMhory stressed that the lands had 
belonged to his family for three generations. He also advanced a specific claim 
beyond Szatmar and Nemethy to the disIpantled fortress of Zynyr Var (Szinyer-
varalja [Seini], which lies between Szatmar and Nagybanya [Baia-Mare]). The 
65 MPV V, 544545: two reports of Possevino to Cardinal Gallio, both dated 16 November 
1582. Also KARpATHY-KRA VJ.A.NSZKY, 168 and POSSEVINO, Trallsi/vallia , 160. The Emperor pro-
vided Possevino with a carriage to speed his journey to Warsaw: ibid. 
66 Ibid., 168; MPV V, 546. 
67 MPV VI 14 
68 MPV V,' 547 548; SIEMIENSKI, III, 425 426. 
69 The editors of MPV suggest that Bolognetti's report to Cardinal Gallio about his discussion 
with Bathory was written between November 18 and 25, 1582. MPV V, 550-552. 
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fact that the Habsburgs had taken over this fortress on ·criminal charges and then 
given it to others especially angered the King. The King went on to rebut other 
arguments put forth by Rudolf and his advisors. The King stressed that he had 
the Szatmar negotiations very much at heart because his surviving nephews 
would reproach him if he did not obtain just restitution7o. 
On November 30 Lippomano, the Venetian ambassador at Vienna, reported 
that Rozdraiewski had requested an audience with the Emperor, at which he 
claimed that his King was being treated disrespectfully because two months had 
passed with no response to his proposals. He stated that if he did not get a re-
sponse within a day, he would interpret the Imperial irresolution as a denial. The 
Emperor replied gently and urged him to wait a few more days, for an official re-
sponse would be coming as soon as possible. The Emperor then held a meeting 
of the Council of State at which a majority felt it best to wait for Possevino 's re-
turn within some fifty days. Others thought it best to put off Rozdrazewski with 
the hope of an accomodation and with talk about consulting all the Christian 
princes. The delaying tactics had a definite purpose since the Emperor had 
meanwhile sent an embassy to Constantinople to seek an eight year truce. A 
truce with the Turks would obviously strengthen Rudolf's hand in dealing with 
Biithory but would largely dash papal hopes of enlisting Rudolf in a crusade 
against the Turks 71. 
Possevino had a meeting with Bathory at the beginning of December in 
which the two discussed the Emperor's decree of 13 July 1582 regarding the 
Szatmar dispute. The King showed evident displeasure with it but then returned 
to a more even tone and when the conversation turned to the establishment of an 
alliance against the Turks the King burst out in elation, «0 opus bonum, 0 opus 
bonum! Utinam ante a in rem perductum fuisset>;72. The King then encouraged 
Possevino to go to Transylvania and study the country for himself, noting what a 
disaster it would be if this bulwark for the defense of Christendom were lost and 
what a good sally port its retention would provide. Possevino took this as a cue 
to tell Biithory how much God would give him light and heart for defending 
Christendom and urged him not to rely on his Turkish allies73 . In fact, at this 
time Bathory was building up the defenses of Varadino (Nagyvarad, Oradea-
Mare) in Transylvania to the distinct displeasure of the Turks74. 
At the end of December, much to the relief of both Rozdrazewski and 
Rudolf II, a special courrier from Possevino arrived in Vienna with letters for 
both of them, which certified that Biithory would be satisfied with compensa-
70 Ibid. 
71 KARpATIIY-KRAVJANSZKY, 169; POSSEVINO, Transiivania, 159. As will be seen, the truce 
between the Emperor and the Sultan was renewed early in 1583, ibid., 160. 
72 MPV V, 589: Possevino to Gallio, 7 December 1582. 
73 Ibid., It may have been at this meeting with Bathory that Possevino gave the King copies of 
his correspondence with Rudolf. Bathory sent copies to Zamoyski, who in turn wote Possevino 
about how pleased the King was with them: «Literas ... quas vehementer se probare Reg. M-tas 
mihi significavit». Zamoyski to Possevino, 6 December 1582: SIEMIENSKI, III, 126. 
74 Ibid., KARpATHy-KRAVJANsZKY, 170. 
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tion. Possevino 's letter contained some specifications about suitable compensa-
tion75• BMhory preferred that Szatmar itself and its adjacent territories be re-
turned, and if the Emperor so wished, he could dismantle the new fortifications 
before their return. Bathory indicated his view that there was no equivalent terri-
tory which could be given him which would not result in even greater danger to 
Hungary, and he insisted that the compensation should not be in Dalmatia or 
some other area distant from his homeland. He urged the Emperor to make a de-
cision «as quickly as possibe» about the the compensation to be offered76• 
The year 1582, then, ended on a positive note. Just compensation and an 
amicable settlement, not war, seemed ahead, but the negotiations soon devolved 
into protracted haggling and two years of delays. 
1583: THE MONARCHS HAGGLE AND TIIE TURKS THREATEN 
The negotiations over the Szatmar dispute moved to a lower key in 1583. 
The Emperor was willing to offer compensation. But what would he offer? 
Would the offer be acceptable to King Stephan BMhory? Would Rudolf attach 
conditions to the territory being offered? These questions dominated the slow 
progress of the negotiations throughout 1583. 
At the beginning of the new year Possevino went over the whole question 
with Stephan Bathory in Krakow and sent Rudolf an account of the discussion 
on January 7, 1583. The King had rejected out of hand the rumors that had been 
circulating at the Imperial court that he was plotting with the Turks against the 
Habsburg possessions in Hungary. He felt that the best solution for the dispute 
would be for the Emperor to dismantle the fortifications at Szatmar and turn the 
city over to him on the understanding that it would not be refortified. The King 
himself took up a pep and redrew the border between Transylvania and Habs-
burg Hungary. Possevino enclosed this map in his letter to the Emperor77. 
On January 15 Gallio, the Cardinal Secretary, wrote Possevino to tell him 
how much he and Gregory XIII were pleased with his report of December 7 
about his discussions with BMhory and with the King's enthusiasm for a cru-
sade. Gallio reported that the Pope took satisfaction in BMhory 's prompt accep-
tance of papal mediation but expressed hope that it might not be needed in view 
of new information received in Rome from Bonomi, the nuncio in Vienna. 
Twice Gallio noted his hope that a speedy accommodation was at hand so that 
the Pope could delight «in seeing as soon as possible these great and good 
75 On 28 December Lippomano sent to Venice a report about the letter and a shortened Italian 
translation, saying that he had obtained the letter «sicurissima strada» and insisted that its con-
tents be kept «molto secreta». Both are printed by J(ARpATHY-KRA VJANszKY, 171 172. Perhaps he 
was puffing up his ability to get secret information. In fact Possevino sent him a copy of his letter 
at the request of Bonomi, the nuncio in Vienna: see Possevino ' s letter to Bonomi, 7 December 
1582, MPV V, 591. 
76 Most of Possevino's Latin letter to Rudolf II, dated 6 December 1582, is printed in MPV V, 
590. 
77 MPV VI, 14n. On the same day, 3 January, Possevino sent a bundle of documents dealing 
with the Szatmiir dispute to Cardinal Gallio. Ibid. 
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princes in peace and union»78. In fact, Bonomi's letter (7 December 1582) was 
more guarded than Gallio suggested. Bonomi felt that the negotiations were go-
ing excellently since the King was willing to accept equal compensation, but he 
pointed out Rozdrazewski's insistence that the compensation must be specified 
and be «in bonis fructiferis et aequivalentibus». Despite remaining difficulties, 
the parties seemed close to an agreement which would conclude the whole prob-
lem. But Bonomi was still more guarded in a letter of December 21 to Gallio af-
ter he had received news from Bolognetti about the mood at the Polish court, and 
he noted that Possevino' s proposals seemed to be too partial to Bathory to please 
the Emperor79. Even less optimistic but more prescient were the reports sent 
home by the ambassadors of Ferrara and of Venice at Vienna; both rightly felt 
that the negotiations were likely to be prolonged8o. Bonomi also reported to Gal-
lio that the Imperial counsellors might want to conclude the negotiations with 
RozdraZewski, the special Polish ambassador, rather than wait for the return of 
Possevino, whose visits to Vienna were often little more than hasty stops. 
Bonomi stressed how the counsellors habitually took their time to reflect on de-
cisions, and noted how he had suggested to the Emperor that he might want to 
offer BMhory a choice of any of the territories and villages in the Szatmar pre-
fecture which the King deemed fair compensation. The King might then send 
commissioners to study the options and gage their worth81. Late in January the 
Emperor did send BMhory a' letter promising that he would forward a list of sev-
eral places as possible compensation; they would be in Hungary but near Tran-
sylvania, as the King wished, but the matter would have to be discussed at the 
forthcoming meeting of the Hungarian Diet at Pozsony [Bratislava, Pressburg], 
which the Emperor was planning to attend. Possevino reported on February 10 
to Bonomi that the King wanted Rozdrazewski to stay at the Imperial court, de-
spite his desire to return home, for the King was eager to be finished with the 
whole affair and was optimistic about the Emperor's good will. He noted that he 
had passed on to Bathory Bonomi's suggestions for the negotiations82. 
In early April the Emperor's agents in Constantinople after long negotia-
tions concluded an eight year truce with the Sultan, although the truce did not 
put an end to chronic border raiding by both sides. Ever since BMhory had come 
to power in Transylvania in 1576, he had been able to use his own alliance with 
the Turks to counter Habsburg pressure. Now Rudolf had carried out a minor 
diplomatic revolution, which became even more evident in August when the 
Sultan sent representatives to dissuade Bathory from any thought of military ac-
tion against the Emperor. They also warned the Polish King not to attack the 
78 Ibid" 26n. 
79 Ibid., 26. 
80 To Ferrara, 18 December: MPV VI, 27n; to Venice, 18 January, KARPATHY-KRAvJANszKY, 
173. 
81 MPV VI, 27n" Bonomi to Gallio, 25 January 1583. Bonomi made the same points to Posse-
vi no in a letter of 26 January: LuKAcs II, 367. 
82 MPV VI, 113. Also KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 172-173, for reports of the Venetian ambas-
sador touching these developments. 
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Tartars, for the Sultan wanted to use them as allies and mercenaries in his on-go-
ing war against Persia83. Moreover, when word reached Vienna in late February 
that BcHhory was seriously ill, the court began to devise strategies to elect Arch-
duke Ernest to the Polish throne, but these were quickly scotched when new re-
ports came in that Bathory had recovered84. 
When Possevino arrived at the Hungarian Diet in Pozsony, he tried a new 
but feeble argument on Johann Trautson, the Emperor's Privy Counsellor: it was 
now even more imperative to solve the Szatmar dispute so as to refute the impu-
tation that the Emperor had sought the help of the hated Turks against a fellow 
Christian prince8s . 
BcHhory remained confident of a settlement. On 28 February he told the 
nuncio Bolognetti that it would be wrong to doubt the good faith of the Em-
peror86. Two weeks later Bishop Rozdrazewski, tired of Imperial procrastina-
tion, insisted on a personal meeting with Rudolf. He was given the Emperor's 
pledge to provide compensation, but the Emperor, it seems, refrained from sug-
gesting specific places, pleading the need to consult with the forthcoming Hun-
garian Diet. Rozdrazewski left the audience still dissatisfied and returned to 
Poland87. 
On 30 March Bathory wrote in his own hand to Possevino, who had been 
on an inspection tour in Transylvania and was about to journey to Pozsony 
to meet with the Emperor at the Hungarian Diet. Bathory indicated that Roz-
drazewski had returned to Krakow and had reported that Rudolf had 'named 
several commissioners who would be going in mid May to Cassovia to discuss 
the specifics of compensation with delegates to be named by the Polish King. 
Possevino would be, there to serve as mediator. BcHhory feared more stalling 
tactics but had agreed to the time and place suggested by Rudolf, even though 
he felt that Rudolf should have first made an offer of specific territory. BcHhory 
speculated that the Emperor's conmissaries (commissarii) would offer several 
villages around the dilapidated fortress of Erd6d to the south of Szatmar. The 
King reminded Possevino that he had earlier told him that such an offer was 
not acceptable because it was not equivalent. «If his Imperial Majesty really 
desires and esteems our friendship, what prevents him from returning our prop-
erty to us?» BcHhory brushed off the argument that the fortifications and villages 
around Szatmar had been improved and claimed he would repay the Emperor's 
83 POSSEVINO, Transiivallia, 159-162; KARPATHy-KRAvJANsZKY, 179. 
84 Ibid., 174 175: Lippornano's dispatches of 22 February and 1 March. 
85 POSSEVINO, Transiivania, 16l. 
86 [Bathory] «Disse anco di piu che quanta a questo negocio, Ie pareva d'essere in sicuro per-
ch€: havendo I , Irnperatore gia confessato il debito et prornesso, non solarnente di sodisfarlo, rna di 
norninar esso i luoghi che voleva dar in recornpensa di Zacrnar et Nernet, non Ii pareva d' haver a 
dubitare della fede d' un prencipe che tenga luogo tale fra gl'altri prencipi di christanita ... » Bolo-
gnetti to Gallio, 1 March 1583: MPV VI, 169. 
87 Ibid., 163n. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 176. 
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costs and promised not to be outdone in generosity. If Rudolf should insist, 
he should keep the villages and dismantle the fortress88. 
After finishing his inspection of Transylvania89, Possevino arrived in Vi-
enna in early April, where he had discussions with Archduke Ernest before mov-
ing on to Pozsony, where he went over the whole Szatmar question first with Jo-
hann Trautson and then with Rudolf himself. On April 25 he sent Rudolf a letter 
urging him to restore Szatmar itself, but on condition that the officer put in 
charge of the fortress by BMhory must also swear an oath to Rudolf that the 
fortress would never be used against the Emperor were the Turks to invade Hun-
gary90. The next day Possevino wrote BMhory and reported on these negotia-
tions; he noted that he had shown Rudolf the hand-written note of March 30 
which Bathory had sent him. The Emperor was pleased since he had not yet been 
informed that the King was going to send a commissary to Cassovia. He 
promised that he would not offer just a few small villages but something equiva-
lent to Szatmar's value at the time when Maximilian II had occupied it91. Also 
on April 26 Possevino wrote a report of his meeting with the Emperor to Cardi-
nal Gallio and added that from conversations with the Venetian Ambassador 
Lippomano, he expected the Emperor's commissaries to employ more stalling 
tactics92. Events were to vindicate this pessimism. 
Lippomano 's own dispatch to the Doge put Possevino 's negotiations in a 
larger context. On April 26 he reported on the Emperor's troubles with the Hun-
garians. At the Diet Rudolf had had to make concessions to Hungarian national 
feeling, promising to appoint Hungarians as bishops, to replace German fortress 
commanders with Hungarians, and to abide by ancient Hungarian law rather 
than trying to rule autocratically. Lippomano followed this with a dispatch of 
May 3 which announced the Imperial-Turkish truce and contained an account of 
Possevino's meeting with the Emperor and his counsellors, an account which he 
must have had from Possevino himself. Lippomano added something that Pos-
sevino had not confided to either BMhory or Gallio: that he had told the Emperor 
that BMhory would be glad to renew the old Polish-Imperial treaty of friendship, 
but since Bathory tended to be a man of action, unless he were given prompt sat-
88 MPV VI, 211. Bathory gave Possevino a copy of Book 7 of Giovanni Michele BRUTo's, Re-
rllm Hungaricarum Libri XX (1490-1552) to fill in his background in preparation for the Szatmar 
negotiations. Since Bruto wrote the work at the King 's request, it was hardly impartial. Reading 
the account of the Protestant Bruto seems to have encouraged Possevino to write his own Transil-
vania for Gregory XIII and to have furnished him with material: LuKAcs II , 558 652. Possevino 
wrote most of the Transilvania during breaks in the negotiations at Cassovia, September to De-
cember, 1583: ibid. , 558 628 652. 
89 On Possevino' s forty-seven day inspection tour of Transylvania, see LuKAcs II, 525-540. 
He visited Szatmar and described its condition to Bathory in a letter of 6 March 1583. He rated its 
fortifications as stronger than those at Riga: ibid., 407-409. After his return to Poland Possevino 
also had severas long conversations with the King about his tour: ibid. , 463. 
90 MPV VI, 264n. 
91 Ibid., 264-266. 
92 Ibid., 267. On April 28 Possevino reported to Bolognetti at the Polish court about a meeting 
that same day with Rudolf; he had give the Emperor a memorial on reasons for solving the di-
spute: ibid., 275. For the memorial : ibid, 264n and ASV, Nllnz. Pol. 15C 171 ff. 
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isfaction he might take advantage of his excellent knowledge of Hungarian dis-
satisfaction with the Habsburg. Were that to happen, the Turks might move in 
and take over all of both Transylvania and Hungary. That possibility had to be a 
factor in encouraging Rudolf to reach a settlement over Szatmar. Lippomano did 
not need to point out that Bathory was himself Hungarian93 . 
Bcithory designated Martin Berzeviczy, his Chancellor for Transylvania, as 
his commissary to meet with the Imperial commissaries94 • The Imperial com-
missaries were led by Gregory Bornemissza (the Bishop of Nagyvarad 
[VaradinoD and included Johann Rueber (the commanding general for Haps-
burg forces in Hungary), Rudolfo Ferdinando Nogarola (the military comman-
der at Szatmar), and the cameral officials Felix Herberstein, Christopher Teuf-
fenbach and Francis Nagyvcithy95 . Berzeviczy was set to leave for Cassovia on 
May 19 when Johann Trautson sent word that the Imperial commissaries would 
be delayed. Bcithory was mildly upset, and Berzeviczy 's departure was post-
poned two weeks96. 
On June 14, shortly after their arrival, the Imperial commissaries offered as 
compensation the small towns of Belek and Dobra, which they claimed were 
more than equivalent to Szatmar and Nemethy because of the beauty of their 
site, the fertility of their fields and their vineyards, forests and pastures. Berze-
viczy scoffed at the offer as totally unequal and threatened to break off the nego-
tiations rather than go on with such an indignity to his King. On June 17 the Im-
perial commissaries slightly raised their offer by adding the town of Erdewdzada 
near the Zamos River; these three towns would be for Szatraar and Nemethy, 
and the commissaries said they had written the Emperor about adding ten 
smaller villages (pagi) inhabited by Walachians. Berzeviczy made it clear that 
Bcithory would prefer areas inhabited by Hungarians rather than by Wala-
chians97. 
The commissaries claimed that they would have to seek more information 
and instructions from Rudolt8. The commissaries returned with a more gener-
ous offer: three more villages in addition to the previous offer, but Berzeviczy 
rejected this as still not equivalent to Szatmar and to the pledges made earlier by 
93 KARpATHy-KRAvJANSZKY, 177-181. It is obvious from Lippomano's dispatches that Posse-
vino was providing him with confidential information, which he forwarded to Venice. Why? 
Most likely because Lippomano was giving him information in tum about affairs and personali-
ties at the Imperial court. Perhaps Possevino was also trying to foster good will toward the Holy 
See and the Jesuits among the Venetian leadel;Ship. 
94 Berzeviczy's activity as commissary is discussed by Endre VERESS, Berzeviczy Marton, 
1538-1596 (Budapest 1911) 158-172. 
95 Ibid., 158; SIEMIENSKJ, 214. Berzeviczy and Rueber were Protestants, much to Possevino 
annoyance: POSSEVINO, Transilvania, 170. Rueber had proscribed Catholicism in Cassovia. Pos-
sevino tried to have him replaced as commanding general by the Catholic Nogarola: LuKAcs II, 
588 594. In April 1584 Nogarola did take over the post, after Rueber 's death : ibid., 695. 
96 Bolognetti to Gallio, 28 May 1583; MPV VI, 322. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 183. 
97 ARSI, Opp. NN. 317113-116. Possevino 's account of the negotiations, which ran from June 
13 to October 20, 1583, includes both oral and written exchanges, see ibid. 112-134. 
98 See Possevino's letters to Cardinal Gallio of 26 June 1583 (MPV VI, 370) and 16 July 1583 
(Ibid., 420). 
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the Emperor. In a letter of July 17 to Possevino Berzeviczy complained that dur-
ing the five weeks he was stuck there (<<hic haereo») the only communication re-
ceived from the Emperor was a statement that he had sent letters to his commis-
saries. Berzeviczy considered this shabby treatment insulting to King Stephan99• 
Possevino replied five days later and urged him not to leave Cassovia without 
giving the Emperor an advanced warning, which should be done respectfully. He 
might want to let the Imperial commissaries know that their delaying was con-
trary to the promise of a swift settlement that Rudolf had given orally to Pos-
sevino in April lOO. 
Possevino showed Bathory his letter to Berzeviczy. The King wrote Pos-
sevino a note indicating his approval and said that he himself had ordered Berze-
viczy home unless there was a response from Rudolf in fifteen days, but that in 
leaving he should not make a protest but simply point to the delays and to the 
Emperor's repeated promises of a swift and fair settlementlOl . In July the Em-
peror revised again his package of compensation for Szatmar. The most impor-
tant item was the fortified town of Nagybanya (Baia-Mare, Rivulus Dominarum) 
some forty miles southeast of Szatmar. Included was the town of Felsoe Banya 
together with several villages: Laczfalva, Orocfalva, Also, Felso, and Siinge-
falva. The offer had several conditions: the friendship treaty between the two 
monarchs must be signed and the places being handed over could not later be 
fortified 102. 
Biithory told Possevino that the recompense being offered was not «equiva-
lent as regards income, much less than as regards jurisdiction, site, lands or 
towns, and so forth» 103. On August 9 Possevino wrote two letters which describes 
another recent conversation with Bathory and the King's frustration. The longer 
letter, to Cardinal Gallio, noted the King's emotion because his family's claims 
to the Szatmar lands were being questioned. His main concern was not the loss 
of income from the lands, for it was only 11,000 thalers; rather his reason for 
pursuing the case was «that my fairness may be manifest to all». The King then 
launched into a long catalogue of his past mistreatment at the hands of Maximil-
ian II, adding details, for instance that he had once sent Maximilian a warning 
about what the Turks were doing. The Emperor betrayed t~is kindness by send-
ing his letter to the Sultan to compromise Biithory's standing with the Turks. 
The whole tenor and content of the conversation made it clear that Bathory's 
99 Ibid. , 437n. 
100 ASV Nunz. Germ. 94 155-156. For Rudolf's promise of a speedy settlement, MPV VI, 
264. 
101 Ibid., 437n. Bolognetti wrote Cardinal Gallio (23 iuly 1583) that Bathory doubted that the 
Szatmar negotiations would lead to good results: MPV VI, 437. 
102 Ibid., 504n. Early in September Count Nogarola, one of the Imperial commissaries, provi-
ded Possevino with a statement of the annual income of Nagybanya and the other towns being of-
fered as compensation. Possevino transmitted this information to the King and his Grand Chan-
cellor Zamoyski: LuKAcs II, 548-550. 
103 Possevino in . Krakow to Bolognetti, 7 August 1583: MPV VI, 474. 
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pride and honor were the real issue in the Szatmar negotiations104. The second 
letter was to Johann Trautson, the Emperor's Privy Counsellor, and quoted the 
King as saying, «God knows that I value fairness so much that I put it above 
Szatmar and everything else»105. 
The King's determination greatly displeased the Council of State at Vienna, 
which was indisposed to increase its offer any further106. On August 7 Berzeviczy 
wrote Possevino and vented his frustrations over the negotiations. As the Impe-
rial commissaries could testify, he had employed supreme moderation and mus-
tered all possible arguments, yet the negotiations made no progress. «They give 
us nothing but words». <<1 candidly confess that I have completely despaired of 
this business». Berzeviczy complained that the Imperial commissaries could do 
nothing without checking with Vienna, and he saw the sinister hand of the Turks 
behind the delays107. Berzeviczy threatened to leave Cassovia, and did so briefly, 
but then Bathory ordered him back to resume discussions. To underline his de-
termination, the King also ordered the reinforcement of one of his border 
fortresses «as a sign of his little good will toward his Imperial Majesty». Rudolf 
replied by having Johann Rueber, his military commander in Hungary, send ad-
ditional troops to reinforce Szatmar108. 
In late August Stephan Bathory wrote two letters which showed his dis-
pleasure. The first was to Possevino and dated August 23; it was so strong that 
Possevino wrote on the back of it: «Perhaps this will have to be burned». The 
King scorned and derided the compensation being offered by the Emperor. Were 
he to accept «such an honon>, as the King termed the compensation sarcastically, 
«ordinary people would undoubtedly judge me to be mad»109. 
Bathory 's second letter (August 28) was addressed directly to the Emperor 
and was more restrained. The King suggested that it was best to bury the mem-
ory of what Maximifian II had done to him and «to show the world his desire for 
the good of all Christians to put down the infidel, whom nobody could ever 
trusb>. He claimed that he never had any desire to fortify Nagybanya. There was 
no purpose in doing so since it was far from Habsburg territory. Had he planned 
to build a fortress directed against the Emperor, he would have selected Hust, 
which was his own possession and close to the Emperor's territory. He also de-
nied the rumors that he had designs to seize Szatmar-had he wanted to seize ter-
ritory, he could easily have taken unfortified places such as Nagybanya and oth-
ers and then held on to them until he received recompense. Instead he had sought 
to recover Szatmar through his ambassadors. He could easily have recruited 
104 Ibid., 478-48l. 
105 Ibid., 478n. 
106 Lippomano' s dispatch of 17 August 1583: KARPATHY-KRA VJANSZKY, 184. 
107 ARSI Opp NN. 317 40r; Opp. NN. 329 187. 
108 Lippomano's dispatch of 6 September: KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 185. 
109 MPV VI, 495. The Imperial commissaries at Cassovia were equally belligerent. They told 
Berzeviczy that unless the King accepted their offer of increased compensation, it would be ob-
vious to everybody that he desired war rather than peace, personal gain rather than the public 
good: Berzeviczy to Possevino, 25 August 1583, ARSI Opp. NN. 317 53r. 
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troops in Transylvania, which had remained at peace while Habsburg Hungary 
was being ravaged by the Turks. Bathory then argued .that Szatmar was of little 
military value for defending Habsburg Hungary since it did not lie across the 
main line of a Turkish offensive. The money that the Habsburgs had spent in for-
tifying it-Bathory estimated the cost at 50,000 to 60,000 Florins-was wasted. 
Worse, its German garrison tended to alienate the Emperor's Hungarian sub-
jects. Were Rudolf to return Szatmar, Bathory promised to give 30,000 thalers 
for its defortification and pledged that he would not allow its refortification. 
Once Szatmar was returned, there would be no more reason for fortifying adja-
cent towns. He closed by calling the Emperor's attention to the disparity be-
tween Szatmar and the Nagybanya mines and Walachian villages which the Em-
peror was offering in compensation. He also promised to foster Catholicism in 
the region, as he had done elsewhere in Transylvaniallo. 
The difference of tone and content in the two letters undoubtedly stems 
partly from the fact that BMhory's second letter was addressed to a fellow 
monarch, but it may owe something to a memorial that Possevino presented to 
the King, most likely at this time. In it Possevino drew on the King's religious 
conviction~ to persuade him to agree to the Emperor's offer. «Listen to Christ 
the Son of God saying, 'If somebody wants your coat, give him your cloak al-
so'». Possevino pointed out that even if the towns and villages being offered did 
not match the value of Szatmar and Nemethy, they were concrete offers, 
whereas for years the Emperor had rejected all demands. Now he was admitting, 
not just in words but in deeds, the justice of BMhory's case, and that was some-
thing worth more than many Szatmars. Even if Possevino's intervention may 
have softened the King's tone, the King continued to reject the Emperor's 
offer11I • 
In August the Sultan sent an envoy to BMhory with the threat of war unless 
he put an end to troop movements on the border with Moldavia and returned to 
Turkish rule four places recently occupied by Polish Cossacks1l2. The Sultan 
110 KARPAUrv-KRAVJANSZKY, 186-187. 
111 Propos ita abAntonio Possevillo Stephallo Regi Pololliae Cracoviae de mellse Augusti 1583: 
ARSI Opp. NN. 317 39-40. Since the memorial refers to the increased compensation (f. 39v), it 
must be toward the end of the month. It comes right after the King' s letter of August 23 in Posse-
vino's letters. 
Jl2 Lippomano 's dispatch of 13 September: KARPAnrv-KRAVJANSZKY, 185. In October 1583 
three thousand Turks launched a devastating raid into Transylvania, sacked many villages, seized 
goods, and carried off prisoners. Troops from Hapsburg Hungary came to the aid of Bathory's 
Transylvanians. The Turkish attack was a reprisal for raids on their territory by Polish Cossacks. 
Bathory wrote the Sultan, suggesting that the Turks should attack the Cossacks, not the Transyl-
vanians, but the Cossacks intercepted his letter and made it public, to his considerable embarras-
sment in Poland. Ibid., 189: Lippomano's dispatch of November 30, which contains a report by 
the Captain at Toccai dated 28 October 1583. Also see POSSEVINO, Trallsilvania , 164-165. On 
December 26 Possevino reported to Cardinal Gallio about more Turkish raids against Habsburg 
Hungary and the poor condition of the fortifications there. This time 400 Transylvanian infantry 
and 400 cavalry had come to the aid of the Hungarians. Clearly the forces of Bathory and the Em-
peror were cooperating against the Turks even without a formal alliance: MPV VI, 724. These 
raids took place despite the Emperor 's eight year truce with the Turks and despite the fact that the 
30 JOHN PATRICK DONNELLY, SJ. 
again warned Bathory against molesting the Tartars, whose help he wanted for 
his war against the Persians, and against stirring up affairs in Hungary now that 
the Emperor had concluded the eight year truce with the Turks113. The Turks also 
increased the tribute that Transylvania had to pay them to 40,000 ducats per 
year1l4. 
ABORTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT CASSOVIA 
It is against this background that Possevino left Krakow on September 14 
to play an active role as mediator at Cassovia, where he took up residence at an 
inn four days later. Others in the papal diplomatic corps were not optimistic 
about his prospects. Bolognetti warned Cardinal Gallio that the I?eeting was 
«not the sort from which one can hope a very speedy conclusion, especially con-
sidering what I have written about how his Majesty discussed with me taking up 
arms against the Turks»1l5. Gallio wrote Possevino before he left Poland to en-
courage him not to despair of success and passed on Gregory XIII's promise that 
«His Holiness will not fail to make use of every effort and of his authority» to 
terminate the controversy. Gallio promised to have Bonomi, the nuncio to the 
Emperor, work for the same end1l6. 
Possevino's stay in Cassovia lasted from late September 1583 until mid 
January 1584, but the King's commissary broke off negotiations and left the city 
on October 20. Possevino's papers contain a running account (June 14 to Octo-
ber 20) of the meetings and exchanges of the two parties that the nuncio was try-
ing in vain to bring togetherl17. Before leaving for Cassovia Possevino prepared a 
bundle of instructions which he then checked out with Bathory. They included 
two sets of instructions, one to be shown generally, the other for Berzeviczy's 
eyes only. If asked why he was attending the meetings of the commissaries of 
the two princes, he WfiS to reply that Bathory felt he could speed up negotiations 
and foster the projected pact of friendship. Possevino understood the mind of 
both princes, Bathory claimed. He was to try to have more authority given the 
Imperial commissaries so as to expedite negotiations1l8. Possevino was given a 
document to show Berzeviczy which was entitled «The Ultimate Resolution of 
His Sacred Royal Majesty in the Szatmar and Nemethy Negotiations Entrusted 
to the Reverend Master Antonio Possevino, Krakow, 19 September 1583». It au-
thorized Berzeviczy to accept Nagybanya as the center piece of the compensa-
tion, and Bathory was willing to promise never to fortify it. If the other places 
Bathory had requested could not be given, the Imperial commissaries would 
have to promise other territories as substitutes. As to the friendship pact: the 
Emperor was paying 130,000 Florins annually and his Hungarian subjects another 500,000 to the 
Sultan as tribute: Possevino to Bathory, 29 December 1583; ibid. 
113 POSSEVINO, Transilvania , 162. 
114 Ibid., 165. 
115 14 August 1583: MPV VI, 485. 
116 20 August 1583; ibid., 488; also 3 September 1583; ibid., 517. 
117 ARSI Opp. NN. 317 113-134. 
118 Ibid., 61-63. 
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King indicated that nothing would be more gratifying to him, but that he would 
send envoys to settle the details of the pact when the Emperor designated the 
place and sent his own commissaries, who were to be invested with full author-
ity119. 
King Stephan put a low value on the compensation being offered by 
Rudolf's commissaries. On September 26 he wrote a stinging answer to Possevi-
no's suggestion of September 21 that the Emperor's offer should be accepted. 
The King attacked the Imperial commissaries: their arguments, drawn «from the 
rules of arithmetic» to inflate the value of Nagybanya and deflate that of Szat-
mar, were inane. BMhory trusted rather the evidence of his own eyes-he knew 
the places in question from personal experience. What he wanted back was his 
Szatmar: 
<<I would consider the smoke of my own property sweeter than the hidden treasures 
buried in the bowels of the earth at Nagybanya ... What keeps his Imperial Majesty from 
returning to me my property?» 
Doing so would do more to solidify friendship 
«than a thousand quibbling and verbose treatises which induce more annoyance than 
conviction ... Why does not the Emperor return the villages? The only reason is avarice. 
.... Henceforward I can hope for nothing great and solid from the friendship of his 
majesty ... .. I have thought often within me that it would have been better for me never to 
have started this negotiation, than having started it, for it to be carried on in such a child-
ish way and to proceed with little or no hope of future goOd»120. 
The negotiations at Cassovia collapsed on October 18 and 19. Bishop 
Bomemissza, the leader of the Imperial commissaries, explained to Berzeviczy 
and Possevino that the delays in responding to Berzeviczy's complaints about 
the offered compensation being inadequate grew out of differences among the 
Emperor's advisors. He repeated the claim that the Emperor's offer was more 
than equal and satisfactory, so that the friendship pact between Poland and the 
Empire should go forward. Later that day the Emperor's commissaries sang the 
praises of the lands he was offering, especially the inexhaustible veins of metal 
in the minesl2l . 
The next day Berzeviczy gave the Imperial commissaries a long letter 
which attacked the earlier delays and argued that they were a ploy to embarrass 
the Polish King. That is why Bathory had earlier decided to order him home. 
Only Possevino's intercession with the King and the nuncio's coming to Casso-
via had induced Bathory to hold back his decision to break off the negotiations122. 
119 Ibid., 63r. On September 12 Bathory wrote to Possevino that if there were an agreement to 
hand over Nagybanya and the other towns and villages offered by the Emperor, Possevino was 
authorized to have Berzeviczy accept the conditions of the Imperial commissaries on an interim 
basis provided that they promised to give other villages in place of those requested by the King if 
these could not be, given. SIEMIENSKJ, III, 435. 
120 MPV VI, 576. 
121 ARSI Opp. NN. 317 126-128. 
122 Ibid., 128. 
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Years ago the Emperor Maximilian had led Bathory to believe that he would get 
back his hereditary possessions, but nothing happened in all the intervening 
years while income from the lands had gone to the Habsburgs. Repeatedly 
Berzeviczy's letter indicated his exasperation over the delays during the previ-
ous four months of negotiations. He went on to denigrate specific aspects of the 
compensation being offered: for instance, he noted that much of the income 
from the vineyards was earmarked for the Church and that the mines involved 
dangerous work and uncertain income but required large capital investments as 
compared to agriculture123. 
At the end of his letter Berzeviczy returned to what he considered the key 
issue: the honor of the Polish King. In refutation of the claims that the compen-
sation was more than equivalent he repeated Bathory 's offer: if the Emperor re-
turned Szatmar and Nemethy, Bathory would demolish the fortifications and 
give the Emperor 30,000 thalers, the cost of the fortifications, and a promise to 
sign the pact of perpetual friendship. He concluded with a bombshell: if the 
commissaries had nothing more to offer, his remaining in Cassovia was point-
less. He was preparing to leave the next morning124. 
That evening the Imperial commissaries sent him a memo complaining that 
his long letter contained nothing that had not already been discussed, but they 
admitted to having nothing new to offer and to being without instructions from 
the Emperor. Berzeviczy responded by saying that he was committed to leaving 
and wished them a good trip home. In the morning of October 20 he sent them a 
note commending them for their zeal and Possevino for his efforts for the com-
mon good, even through the negotiations had failed, but he claimed that it would 
be unworthy of the King 's dignity for him to continue the negotiations125 . One of 
the Imperial commis:;;aries, Count Nogarola, was in turn so incensed by Berze-
viczy's behavior that he later told Possevino that it was unworthy of the Em-
peror to have further dealings with Bathory126. 
That day Possevino met briefly with the Imperial commissaries and said 
that it 
"pained him that in this whole affair, in which he had been involved for the whole 
year with complete sincerity, he had been unable to bring either of the princes to the point 
of outdoing the other in generosity». 
123 Ibid., 129r-131r. Possevino reported to Gregory XIII that Felix Haberstein, one of the Impe-
rial commissaries, held a contract controlling the mines and had furnished Berzeviczy with argu-
ments about their profitability, thereby complicating the negotiations. Haberstein seems to have 
been motivated by the desire to retain his control of the mines whether they remained under the 
Emperor or whether they were awarded Bathory (by ingratiating himself with Berzeviczy and Ba-
thory): POSSEVINO, Transilvania, 170. Following the Acta of the Cassovia meeting there are se-
ven folios which list the income from Szatmar, Nemethy, Nagybanya and of the other villages 
being offered in compensation, including information on the mines: ARSI Opp. NN. 317 135-
142. 
124 Ibid., 131r. POSSEVINO'S Transiivania, 170, written for Gregory XIII, speaks harshly of Ber-
zeviczy ' s high-handed manner in dealing with the Imperial commissaries. 
125 ARSI Opp. NN 317 131-133. 
126 LuKAcs, II, 593. 
POSSEVINO AS PAPAL MEDIATOR 33 
He urged them not to leave Cassovia until they h~d written both monarchs 
about the breakup of negotiations. The Imperial commissaries agreed to this. 
Possevino promised them that he would stay at Cassovia until a messenger re-
turned from Biithory; he also promised to send Biithory their proposals127. 
Meanwhile Possevino wrote to both Bathory and the Emperor to prevent a 
total breakdown of the negotiations. Possevino sent letters to the King on Octo-
ber 19 and 20. The first, before Berzyviczy's bombshell, noted that the King was 
already aware of the impasse; Possevino pleaded that he had tried to make clear 
Biithory's sincerity and goodwill to the Emperor despite hostile elements at the 
Imperial court. He urged the King to be patient and promised that he would write 
and encourage the Emperor to act promptly. As a favor to the Pope he asked 
Bathory for authority to break off negotiations if the Emperor made no new offer 
or to agree on minor points if the Emperor made concessions since the lands in 
questions were of minor importance. Such powers would speed up negotiations. 
Possevino suggested that it would be good if he were to visit Krak6w, Prague 
and Saxony to promote an alliance because he could accomplish much more 
face to face than through correspondence128. 
His letter of the evening of October 20 was accompanied by various other 
letters and documents which demonstrated his efforts to prevent a breakdown of 
the negotiations. Possevino claimed that the Imperial commissaries, having 
pledged three more villages, said that they had no authorization to concede any-
thing further and begged Possevino to persuade the King not to ask for more. 
Possevino promised to try. When questioned further on whether they had power 
to hand over the possession of Nagybanya and the other villages, they said they 
could promise ratification but would have to seek the Emperor's permission as 
regards the actual take-over of the lands. A response on that point would take 
from twenty to twenty-five days. Possevino promised them that he would wait 
for an answer from the Emperor. He asked Bathory to have either Berzyviczy or 
another noble man on hand at Cassovia to await the Emperor's reply129. 
The next day Possevino wrote the Emperor and told him that Berzeviczy 
was leaving on the King's orders despite all his own efforts to persuade him in 
the name of the Holy See to stay at Cassovia and wait for the Emperor's re-
sponse. Possevino recapitulated that status of the negotiations: Biithory had 
promised in an autograph letter not to fortify Nagybanya and to renew the 
friendship pact with Rudolf. Possevino had also persuaded him to surrender his 
claim to a few small villages and their peasants near Szatmar in return for their 
equivalent elsewhere. Since the Emperor had offered the three villages of Lazar, 
Bozonta and Totfalu, the dispute could have ended, but Berzyviczy's declaration 
had prevented that. Possevino begged the Emperor to make new and prompt of-
127 ARSI Opp. NN. 317 134r. 
128 Ibid., 77v-78v. For parts of this letter not dealing with the Szatmar negotiations, see Lu-
KAcs, II, 555. 
129 ARSI Opp. NN. 317 78v-79r. 
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fer : «he who gives quickly gives twice». He suggested obliquely that the delay 
in the Emperor's previous offer, quite as much as its substance, had alienated 
Bathory and his commissary. Possevino went on to suggest that the Pope would 
be agreeable to his immediately coming to see Rudolf personally. Possevino 
suggested to the Emperor that Bathory's actions may have derived from his fear 
of the Turks, but were Imperial kindness to take the initiative, Bathory would 
likely agree to ending the dispute130. Rudolf's response to the evolving situation 
was anything but prompt, for on 10 December Possevino was complaining to 
Bonomi, the nuncio to the Emperor, that he still had not received a reply. On the 
same day he sent Rudolf a second letter seeking a decisionl31. 
BMhory's reply was as prompt as Rudolf's was slow. The King wrote Pos-
sevino on October 27 and made it clear that Berzeviczy had not been acting on 
his own. Bathory castigated the Emperor for «showing himself so difficult in 
these minor matters». Having once made clear his proposal, Bathory felt that for 
him to change it like some merchant haggling over prices would be inconsistent 
with his dignity. The King claimed he was now going to reveal to Possevino for 
the first time the reason for his stubbornness. In doing so he was implicitly push-
ing aside Possevino's arguments for his accepting the Emperor's offer. Bathory 
argued that acceptance would expose his relatives (who were his co-claimants to 
the villages to be given as compensation) to inconvenience, injury and the possi-
ble confiscation of their goods by the Emperor. «The result would be that they 
would raise everywhere a public outcry and complaint against us. To avoid that, 
we are prepared rather to endure ourselves any kind of inconvenience in our own 
fortunes». This is the reason why the King stood by the instructions he had given 
Berzeviczy either to obtain the villages or return home with the business unfin-
ished. The King cOI\tinued, «This is now the final statement of our mind; he can 
expect no other from us». If the Imperial commissaries granted him the villages, 
then the negotiations could be concluded in God's name, and they could hand 
over possession to Berzeviczy as soon as possible. Should they lack that power, 
they should seek it immediately from the Emperor. Berzeviczy had been autho-
rized to leave Cassovia. Somebody would be sent to take possession if the Em-
peror agreed. The King authorized Possevino to deal with the Emperor about the 
King's sending commissaries or an ambassador to renew the friendship pact132. 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CASSOVIA NEGOTIATIONS 
Possevino stayed in Cassovia another three months, partly writing his Tran-
silvania for Gregory XIII, partly trying tp restart the negotiations. The timing of 
the friendship pact gradually emerged as a roadblock to a: settlement. Both sides 
claimed they wanted it. The Emperor wanted to finalize the pact before handing 
over territorial compensation for Szatmar. BMhory was opposed to linking the 
pact directly to the Szatmar negotiations and held out for signing the pact only 
130 Ibid. , 79-80. 
131 LuKAcs, II, 588. 
132 MPV VI, 626. 
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after the compensation agreed upon had been handeq over to him, otherwise it 
might seem to his Polish subjects that he had obligated Poland to something as a 
price for regaining his family lands in Transylvania. An unnamed Imperial com-
missary came to Possevino at Cassovia and told him frankly that the Polish King 
would never be given possession of the places designated as compensation un-
less he first renewed that pact133. 
Since Bathory had earlier quietly authorized Possevino to negotiate the 
friendship pact, provided certain conditions were met, five days after Berze-
viczy's departure Possevino took the problem into his own hands and wrote 
Archduke Ernest, the Emperor's brother and governor of Imperial Hungary. He 
promised Ernest that the pact would certainly be ratified as soon as possession of 
the towns and territories agreed upon for compensation were handed over. Pos-
sevino told him that the reason for this was that Bathory needed to keep separate 
the affairs of Poland, where he was elected king of Poland and worked under 
many constitutional restraints, from the affairs of Transylvania, where he was an 
hereditary nobleman and the de facto regent for his young nephew Sigis-
mund134. 
Possevino also told the Archduke that if there were no compensation, there 
would be no friendship pact. Linkage between the two must remain de facto, not 
de jure. He assured Ernest that if the details of the compensation were worked 
out, he was certain that the pact would follow, for the King had promised him as 
much both orally and in a letter written in the King's own hand. «If full power 
were given the Imperial commissaries, then the business can be concluded with 
ease». Such a step would quiet BMhory's fears that once the friendship pact was 
signed, the compensation might not be forthcoming. The Turks, who feared the 
pact, would have no opportunity to stir things up. The settlement of the dispute 
would be welcome by the Pope, who was involved in the question, and by the 
Polish senators, who would see it as a sign of the Emperor's good will toward 
their kingdom. Possevino told Ernest that his viewpoint was shared by Jan 
Zamoyski, the powerful Polish Grand Chancellor135• Possevino's letter also in-
133 « ... io credo ch'il pili importante sara che l'Imperatore non vorra dare possesso della ricom-
pensa di Satmar senza vedere prima rinovati i patti co'l Regno di Polonia; al che fin 'hora iI Re 
non ha voluto accosentire» . Possevino to Cardinal Gallio, 21 November 1583: ibid., 663. 
134 POSSEVINO, Transiivania, 167; Possevino to Ernest, 25 October 1583, ARSI Opp. NN. 317 
81-83. Possevino also wrote to Ernest as viceroy for Habsburg Hungary on 21 October and exhor-
ted him to work toward a settlement since that would curb unrest. He used the letter to attack Pro-
testant officials who made Catholic worship so difficult in Habsburg Hungary that, Possevino 
claimed, Catholics had more freedom in Turkish Hungary. Ibid., 80-8!' 
135 Ibid., 82. In his letter to Ernest of October 21 Possevino noted that he had secured the sup-
port of August, Duke of Saxony and the most powerful of the German Protestant princes, for a 
settlement of the dispute between Rudolf and Bathory. He also urged that a settlement would 
serve to lessen the antipathy of Hungarians toward the Emperor and their sympathy toward Ba-
thory, who was of Hungarian ancestry. ARSI Opp. NN. 317 81r. Also see MPV VI, 551n. In a let-
ter to Johann Rueber, a Protestant, (17 November 1583) Possevino recalled that the Duke of Sa-
xony had twice written to King Stephan urging that a settlement of the Szatmar dispute was in the 
interests of the Empire and of Christendom. KARP A THY-KRA VJANSZKY, 190. The Duke wrote Ba-
thory again on 30 April 1584 to urge a settlement: MPV VII, 279n. 
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voked his role as nuncio and told the Archduke that the settlement of the dispute 
could be of greatest importance for uplifting the Kingdom of Hungary, for it was 
close to the Pope's heart that from the settlement something much greater could 
come. He did not have to spell out an anti-Turkish alliance136. 
Possevino 's appeal to Archduke Ernest was largely successful, for the Em-
peror agreed that his offer of Nagybanya and the other territories would be made 
to Stephan not as King of Poland but to the house of Bathory as recompense for 
their patrimony; the ten portiones or villages near Szatmar would remain feuda-
tory property within the Kingdom of Hungary and subject to the same obliga-
tions borne by the other nobles of the Kingdom137. The Emperor's response on 
this point was slow in coming-on December 7 Possevino was complaining to 
Cardinal Gallio that he was still waiting for it138. By mid November Berzeviczy 
had returned to Cassovia, but his return brought little joy to the Imperial com-
missaries, for he spent his time traveling the surrounding countryside. He 
claimed that he was going hunting, or looking after his health, or seeking fodder 
for his horses, but Bornemessza and the other Imperial representative feared that 
his conversations with the local inhabitants might involve subversive activity139. 
On December 10, while still awaiting the Imperial reaction to the stalled 
negotiations and his initiatives to Archduke Ernest, Possevino wrote to Bathory 
and suggested three possible reasons for the delays. First, the Emperor was un-
prepared to defend Habsburg Hungary from Turkish attack, and the Turks may 
have warned Rudolf against reaching an agreement with BMhory, even though 
Possevino felt that the Emperor personally desired such an agreement. Secondly, 
his advisors considered his offer of compensation was more than fair, so that 
BMhory's request for increased compensation was demeaning to the Emperor. 
Likewise BMhory's postponement of the friendship pact was offensive to many 
at court, especially the Spanish faction. Thirdly, some of the Emperor's advisors 
might be fearful that Bathory's steadfast adherence to his demands might result 
in more «indignities» to the Emperor when the friendship pact came to be final-
ized. Possevino argued that were BMhory in the Emperor's place, he too would 
be fearful of the Sultan's power and his desire to take over all of Hungary140. Pos-
sevino suggested that should the Emperor 's agents spin out more delays, he 
should go and talk with Rudolf personally. Were the Imperial advisors (perhaps 
out of fear of the Turks) to insist that possession could not he handed over before 
the friendship pact was concluded, he would like to see the business concluded 
136 «Etenim cum propensissima Summi Pontificis mens sit, ut hac re composita, aliquid aliud 
ad Divinam gloriam ad res Christianas statuendas sine strepitu et sine periculo disponatur». ARSI 
Opp. NN. 317 8Ov. In his Transilvania (p. 168) Possevino gave Gregory XIII several additional 
reasons why he was anxious to avoid linking the friendship pact de jure with the Szatmar com-
pensation. One was that linkage might give Polish Protestant grounds to claim papal interference 
in their national affairs. 
137 Transilvania, 168. 
138 MPV VI, 700. 
139 Ibid. , 701 n; Transilvania, 170. 
140 MPV VI, 707 708. 
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on the basis of the agreements made so far, so as not .to give an opportunity for 
those at the Imperial court who opposed an agreement to raising new difficul-
tiesl4l. Toward the end of December the Imperial Council of State met and de-
cided against increasing the compensation to be offered Bathory. Some argued 
that increased compensation was a small price to pay for an alliance with 
BMhory, but the prevailing view was that the current offer was fully equivalent 
to Szatmar142. 
On the last day of 1583 Possevino reported to Cardinal Gallio that he and 
Berzeviczy were still waiting at Cassovia and that on the previous day letters 
had gone to Archduke Ernest urging him to hurry a response from the Emperor. 
He felt that the Imperial advisors were caught between fears for the Emperor's 
dignity and fear that BMhory might break off relations. As for BMhory, Pos-
sevino wondered why he was so stubborn, since he had many good reason to ac-
cept the Emperor 's offer143• Possevino 's growing distaste for the endless negotia-
tions was exacerbated by his living conditions at Cassovia, where he and his Je-
suit companion had to spend four months «in two small rooms like a prison» at a 
local hostell44 . He also disliked the two leading commissaries he had to deal with. 
Rueber, the Imperial general, resided at Cassovia; he was very polite to Pos-
sevino, but he was a Calvinist and had suppressed Catholic worship in the sur-
rounding region so that Possevino had to celebrate Mass in his small rooms145 . 
Berzyviczy, Possevino declared, was «a Calvinist and has done various diaboli-
cal things» 146. 
TOWARD A FINAL SETrLEMENT 
The year 1584 and the first months of 1585 brought the long negotiations of 
the Szatmar dispute toward an amicable conclusion. January 1584 found Pos-
sevino still awaiting the Emperor's response. Berzyviczy returned to the Polish 
court in mid December despite the plea of Archduke Ernest that he remain at 
Cassovia awaiting the Emperor's response to the latest proposals, specifically 
141 Ibid., 709. Rueber suggested to Possevino that Turkish military operations in Transylvania 
and Hungary were designed to pressure the timid at the Imperial court into postponing a settle-
ment and an alliance with the Polish King: Possevino to Zamoyski, 5 october 1583. SIEMIENSKI 
III, 220. Possevino argued just the opposite in a letter to Rueber (17 November 1583): If a Polish-
Imperial pact was not signed, in the coming summer there might be a Turkish invasion of Hab-
sburg Hungary. J(ARpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 190. Sathory called a meeting of the Polish Diet to 
treat with the Turkish menace to Transylvania: Lippomano's report of 13 December 1583, ibid., 
191. 
142 Lippomano 's report to Venice, 27 December 1583: ibid. , 192. 
143 MPV VI 730 
144 Ibid., 37: . 
145 LuKAcs II, 588594. After Rueber died 23 March 1584, Lippomano rated his military skills 
very highly and regarded his death as a major loss to the Habsburgs. His post went to the Catholic 
Count Ferdinando di Nogarola partly because the Hungarians were strongly opposed to another 
German getting the office of commanding general in Hungary. Dispatch of 3 April 1584: KARPA-
THy-KRAVJANsZKY, 194-195. 
146 MPV VII, 48. 
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that three more villages with their peasants would be given Bathory 147. On Jan-
uary 6 Bathory wrote Possevino and again bitterly complained about the Emper-
or's delaying tactics and said that recently he had told the nuncio Bolognetti that 
he doubted a favorable outcome from the negotiations. Bolognetti was more 
hopeful and urged patience. The King told Possevino to refrain from further ne-
gotiations in Berzyviczy's absence148. Four days later Bolognetti wrote the King 
and again begged him not to break off negotiations; the delays were to be more 
attributed to the excessive care of Rudolf's minsters and the press of other busi-
ness than to any desire of the Emperor to slight the Polish King149. 
The Emperor sent a letter to Possevino on December 23 promising to sat-
isfy the Polish King and put an end to the dispute 150, but the «Final Response» of · 
his commissaries, addressed to Berzyviczy on 7 January 1584, made several 
concessions but was also hedged with conditions. The Szatmar compensation 
package was not to be linked directly to the friendship pact. The Emperor agreed 
to add the three villages (Lazar, Bozonta and T6tfalu) to the compensation pack-
age, as suggested by his commissaries, but refused other villages near Szatmar. 
B<ithory was not to fortify Nagybanya and the villages given him and was to re-
ceive them not as the King of Poland but as a member of the Bathory family. 
Hence they were to remain part of Hungary and as such under Rudolf's jurisdic-
tion as King of Hungaryl5l. 
Possevino sent Berzeviczy a long memo which urged the acceptance of the 
Emperor's offer of compensation with minor conditions152. The memo in fact 
seems as much aimed at the King as at his chancellor, and develops the case for 
accepting the Emperor's offer which Possevino had suggested in letters to the 
King and to Bolognetti back on September 21153. Possevino argued in his memo 
that a major difficulty was that while Nagybanya and the other compensation 
were to be given to the B<ithory family, ten villages (portiones) were to be re-
tained by the Emperor because they were said to be needed for the Szatmar 
fortress 154. Their possession would be given only under feudal obligations (bona 
feudaria), for the Hungarian kings could not alienate Hungarian territory. More-
over the towns and the ten villages would pay the normal taxes to Rudolf as 
Hungarian king. Possevino recounted the many advantages these seeming re-
147 Ibid 13 
148 Bath~ry 'to Possevino, 6 January 1584: ibid., 11-12. 
149 Ibid., 19-20. 
150 Ibid., 29n. 
151 Ibid., 29n. 
152 ASV Nunz. Germ. 94247-250. A different copy of the same document is partly reprinted in 
MPV VII, 29n, where the editor dates it circa 15 January 1584. 
153 Ibid., 575 for his letter to Bolognetti; SlEMlENSKI III, 214, for his letter to Bathory. 
154 What is meant by portiones? The term comes up repeatedly in the negotiations. Other docu-
ments speak of «decem portiones seu villas», hence villages or estates (ARSI Opp. NN. 317167v) 
and of «de portionibus iIIis rusticorum» (MPV VI, 706) and «portione di· rustici» (POSSEVINO, 
Transilvania, 169), hence they include the peasants living and working in the villages. Elsewhere 
Bathory derided the idea that Szatmar «without these portiones would not have enough wine, as if 
indeed an abundance of wine were to come from these small portions (portiunculis) >> . MPV VII, 
699. Here portiones is usually translated as villages. 
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strictions would have and recalled how two years earliyr he had suggested to the 
King low key negotiations when BMhory had first brought up the issue of re-
opening the Szatmar question. Then delays and failures would have reflected 
less on the authority of the monarch. Having the lands as a Hungarian feudatory 
would entail certain advantages for the BMhory family and serve as a sort of in-
surance after Stephan's death, given the uncertainly of Transylvanian politics 
and the possibility that the Turks might invade their land or increase their tribute 
or back a different family for the office of Prince of Transylvania. Reaching a 
settlement with the Emperor would enhance Bathory's reputation among Chris-
tian princes because of his zeal for public tranqUillity. 
Anticipating the potential objection that the King's acceptance of Nagy-
banya under feudal conditions might seem to be subjecting the King of Poland to 
another prince, Possevino pointed out, among other examples, that Philip II was 
a feudatory of the Emperor for the Duchy of Milan without losing his dignity 
and that God used such bonds among princes to keep them from being enslaved 
by the Turks. Finally Szatmar itself, when it had belonged to the BMhory family, 
owed feudal obligations to the Hungarian kings155 . About January 20 Possevino 
left Cassovia for Krakow; he wrote Bathory while on the way and urged him to 
agree to the Emperor's offer since its conditions were acceptable156. He repeated 
his plea from Krakow on January 28157. 
BMhory was anything but pleased by the Emperor's offer. He wrote a bitter 
letter to Possevino on January 28, accusing the Emperor of insincerity. Some 
people, BMhory charged, thought that he had exceeded the requirements of his 
dignity, but he preferred to be seen as putting concord ahead of his dignity. «We 
therefore now think we should have nothing further to do with his Imperial 
Majesty about these matters». Bathory's ironic postscript said that the Emperor 
had a wonderful way of achieving peace and ended by putting Satan's words to 
Christ into Rudolf's mouth (Mt. 4:9): «I will give you all these things if you fall 
down and adore me». The King's response must have shaken Possevino. He 
rewrote the King's letter and made it a bit milder; on it he wrote a note that 
Berzeviczy had not yet reported to the King nor given him Possevino's own let-
ter of January 28. These, Possevino hoped, might mellow the King158. 
Despite the King's claim that he was going to break off the Szatmar negoti-
ations, he continued to receive and study the reports and papers of the Cassovia 
155 ASV Nunz. Germ. 94 247-250. 
156 ASV Nunz. Pol. 158 37l. 
157 Ibid., 386. 
158 Both versions of the King's letter are printed in MPV VII, 45-46; for Possevino annotations, 
ibid., 46n. On January 22 Cardinal Bolognetti had written Cardinal Gallio about the King's de-
pressed mood : ibid., 32. On January 31 Possevino wrote to Gallio about the King 's desire for con-
tinuous military activity may have been a sort of escapism «<il desiderio di vol ere sempre esser in 
armi gli facesse far qualche scappata in quello che piu d 'una volta ho visto i cenni»): ibid., 48. 
From May 1585 to December 1586 Bathory lapsed into deep depression: DAVIES I, 432. His stub-
bornness, bitterness and preoccupation with his dignity during the Szatmar negotiations seem 
early symptoms of approaching mentaf instability. 
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negotiations159. Having done so, he wrote Possevino on February 11 to say that 
«We are not at all pleased with the response of the Emperor nor can We be». The 
Emperor's representatives had spun things out for months only to come up with 
an unsatisfactory solution. «We shall therefore now abstain from further deal-
ings with them, for that is what they want, and commit our cause to both God 
and to time»160. Ironically the same day, ignorant of the King's letter, the nuncio 
Bolognetti wrote to encourage Possevino and praise him since «no ill will is 
enough to obscure the light of those things which with true zeal and an open 
heart are undertaken or the service of God and his holy church»161. Meanwhile 
King Stephan had more important things to worry about: a rebellion in Livonia 
and rumors of a truce between the Sultan and the Shah162. 
Possevino received notice of the King's displeasure with the outcome of 
the Casso via negotiations on February 17. This must have been doubly depress-
ing, for it meant that not only were four months of his own work apparently 
wasted, but more important, good relations between the two monarchs and their 
alliance against the Turks was as far away as ever. Nonetheless the next day Pos-
sevino wrote the King and tried to persuade him to continue efforts toward an 
understanding. Possevino used as his point of departure information he had re-
cently received from Simon Forgach, an Imperial official in Hungary. Forgach 
felt that unless Bathory showed some openness to a settlement, perhaps on 
somewhat better conditions, people would apply to him the proverb, «He who 
wants to get rid of a friend looks for an excuse». Possevino argued that the Em-
peror's proposal would not have imposed the conditions he had «unless all the 
Hungarian counsellors had proven on oath that it was necessary for the Kingdom 
of Hungary». He asked BMhory, who knew Hungarian conditions perfectly, to 
provide him with arguments he could use to undermine this contention; Pos-
sevino would advance the arguments without using the King's name. Possevino 
partly defended the Emperor, who had not tried to take advantage of the Turkish 
incursions into Transylvania nor made an issue «of the harsh responses of a cer-
159 Possevino wrote (4 February 1584) to Bolognetti that he had sent Zamoyski a full account of 
the meetings which the King had urgently requested. Berzeviczy made his own report to the King. 
MPV VJl, 49-50. Six days later Bolognetti reported to Cardinal Gallio that the King was much 
occupied with «a huge bundle of letters from Transylvania», which Bolognetti thought dealt with 
the Szatmar negotiations. MPV VII, 68. He added a postscript that he had just received a letter 
[that of 28 January noted above] from Possevino defending his role in the Szatmar negotiations. 
Possevino wrote it in Latin so that Bolognetti could show it to the King. Bolognetti sent it to Ba-
thory together with his own cover letter and told Gallio that he would talk to the King in a few 
days when the King came to Vilnius, but since his information was second hand, he doubted if his 
words would carry much weight in preventing <<the efforts of Berzeviczy from prevailing in the 
heart of the King over the accounts of the Father [Possevino]». Ibid., 70. 
160 MPV VII, 72. As Bonomi pointed out to Bolognetti (27 July 1584) in Poland decisions 
could be made quickly by Bathory, but in Prague he and Possevino had to deal with Rudolf him-
self, then his advisors, and then decisions affecting Hungary had to be referred to Archduke Er-
nest, the governor of Hungary, and his council: ibid., 376. The next month Possevino warned Bo-
lognetti that at Prague <<il difetto di ogni minima cosa genera dilationi in quel consiglio». Ibid., 
409. 
161 Ibid. , 74 . . 
162 Ibid., 78. 
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tain person» [obviously Berzeviczy]. Possevino had. ascertained and Forgach 
had confirmed that Bathory's relatives in Hungary regarded as acceptable the 
feudal obligations tied to the return of the properties, especially if they could be 
modified. Indeed, a link to the Emperor was desirable for them, otherwise they 
might be open to Turkish threats. Perhaps a bit forgetful of his role as nuncio, 
Possevino describes himself as the King's most faithful servant when he begged 
the King to provide him with a document that would show everybody that the 
King was rejecting conditions governing the settlement not because of his own 
wish but for reasons of justice. He asked the King to write him letters authoriz-
ing him to keep the negotiations going163. 
The same day Possevino wrote Bolognetti and said that while he had ex-
pected the King's letter to bring him the greatest pain he had ever experienced, 
he had not lost hope despite the breakdown of the negotiations. One reason for 
his hope (something that he deliberately had not mentioned in his letter to the 
King but did mention to Bolognetti) was the fact that those favoring a settlement 
could count on the support of Jan Zamoyski, the powerful Grand Chancellor. 
Possevino asked Bolognetti to support his efforts and to discuss the matter with 
Zamoyski after first pledging his wholehearted efforts for a settlementl64. A gen-
tle conspiracy was forming to bring the King around. 
Zamoyski wrote Possevino on February 13 and describes how dejected he 
was over the breakdown of negotiations but how he had taken heart because the 
differences involved only a few minor villages. Keeping in mind how Possevino 
had always insisted that what was really important in the negotiations was the 
«public advantage of the Christian name» Zamoyski had left his estates and 
sought out the King, with whom he had discussed the conditions for taking pos-
session of the lands being offered for compensation. In Hungary these feudal 
obligations include an oath of allegiance, paying taxes, and military service, 
among other things, and these obligations bound the nobility not only to the 
monarch but also to his lieutenants. To accept such conditions would involve an 
indignity to somebody of Bathory stature. Undertaking them would open the 
King to criticism in Poland. Zamoyski had therefore sought out in his discussion 
with the King what had been the earlier obligations tied to Szatmar. The King 
had informed him that the Szatmar lands were held not as a part of Transylvania, 
but as a part of the Kingdom of Hungary. Reflecting later on his discussion with 
the King, Zamoyski thought he could find a legal loophole so that Bathory could 
rightly escape unacceptable conditions for the new lands. Since there was ques-
tion of taking possession of new lands, a mere letter of investiture could be used, 
without an oath or homage or other burdens. «I calculated that on this basis ... 
the dignity of his Imperial Majesty could be taken into account and all the diffi-
culties avoided which his Royal Majesty has seen». But Zamoyski felt it would 
be best for Possevino to broach the question with BMhory on a less formal basis. 
163 Ibid., 81-83. 
164 Ibid., 85-86. 
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If Possevino were to do SO, Zamoyski promised his full backing to bring the 
whole business to the end «from which your Paternity was wont to promise so 
much good not only for both realms but for all Christendom»165. 
Possevino's efforts to get an accord had not enjoyed much success, and 
March 3 Cardinal Gallio wrote him that his expense account had been cut in 
half, from 100 to 50 scudi per month166. This action suggests that Rome was be-
coming impatient with negotiations that seemed to be endlessly protracted. Even 
before he got this bad news Possevino was writing Gallio (13 March 1584) from 
Prague to apologize for the delays; he argued that the negotiations between 
Rudolf and Bathory had not cost «the Apostolic See anything either before God 
or before these and other princes»; the Emperor would have less willing to offer 
recompense, for prior to papal involvement the Imperial court had simply ig-
nored Polish efforts to raise the question. The negotiations had provided an oc-
casion «to treat of many other good causes here, and in Hungary, and in Poland 
and in Saxony». The negotiations had led, for instance, to proposed papal subsi-
dies for Bathory's building fortifications against the Turks at Illye and Mount 
Aranyi167. Possevino also invoked his efforts to line up the Duke of Bavaria's 
support for two of his pet projects, a colony of German Catholics for Transylva-
nia and the establishment of a military academy to train Catholic officers. The 
ongoing negotiations may have given the Turks pause, the Polish king had not 
broken with the Emperor, and relations had improved l68. 
Better still was Bolognetti 's letter of March 12 letter in Vilnius to Cardinal 
Gallio that Bathory was eager for a war against the Turks, but was determined to 
have the backing of the Emperor and the German princes before starting a con-
flict. He had also discussed the Szatmar question with the King, who «used 
rather harsh words at the beginning», but the conversation confirmed Bolognetti 
in the conviction ttlat the King could be brought around169. 
Also on March 12 Bolognetti described for Possevino a recent audience 
with Bathory which discussed the case for accepting the Emperor's conditions. 
The King said he «was amazed how [Possevino] supposed that the conditions 
proposed by the Emperor merited being accepted». Bathory claimed that God 
had made him free, and he had no intention of surrendering his freedom for any-
thing, much less something so unimportant; he said he was ashamed to have 
wasted so much effort over the affair and having involved the Holy See in it. The 
peace of Christendom did not depend on Szatmar or Nagybanya. As for seeking 
concord with the Emperor, he had done his part. Bolognetti still found some 
hope in the King's words, for he becarp.e more calm as their discussion pro-
gressed and claimed that he had never asked for the dismemberment of Hungary 
nor the incorporation of the territories into Transylvania. Bolognetti suggested 
165 SIEMIENSKI III, 264-266. 
166 MPV VII, 114. 
167 Possevino described the fortress project for Gregory XIII in his Transilvania, p. 182. 
168 MPV VII, 133-135. 
169 Ibid., 125-127. 
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that Possevino should hasten to the Imperial Court and build on the last state-
ment of Bathory; he should try to keep the negotiations going and make sure that 
Rudolf did not withdraw his offer. Bolognetti wrote that he wanted to believe 
that the Emperor's response would be «very good and conformed to all our 
desires» 170. 
Possevino had already been in Prague several days when he wrote Bathory 
on March 12 to say that since he had received nothing to communicate to the 
Emperor on the compensation issue, he had evaded the issue when questioned 
whether the Emperor's offer was acceptable. He told Bathory that he had delib-
erately not shown Imperial officials Bathory's letter to him of February 11 re-
jecting the Imperial offerl7l since he hoped that new information might have 
changed the King's mind172. 
Possevino had a long audience with the Emperor on March 22 which built 
on preliminary discussions with Imperial officials and led to several break-
throughs173. Possevino showed Rudolf the letter Zamoyski had sent him on 
February 13 which suggested a loophole that would allow Bathory not to take 
any unacceptable oaths or feudal obligations which would subordinate him to 
the Emperor. Rudolf indicated that he was pleased by Possevino's work and that 
he had not given up hope of an agreement174. Zamoyski's letter arrived only two 
day before Possevino's audience with Rudolf; on receiving it Possevino was ju-
bilant for he had a powerful new argument to circumvent Bathory's unwilling-
ness to take an oath and accept feudal obligations that would seem to subordi-
nate him to the Emperor. Aside from indignity to Polish Kingship, an oath to 
Rudolf would poison Bathory's relations with the Sultan as overlord of Transyl-
vania. Possevino wrote to Zamoyski the day before his meeting with the Em-
peror: «May God bless your Illustrious Lordship again and again, for whom God 
(as in other things) has perhaps preserved the greatest palm and role in the agree-
ment». Unless a loophole or technicality was found, the friendship between the 
princes might dissolve, «without which I see that all of Hungary and Transylva-
nia will fall into ruin» 175. 
Possevino's correspondence does not spell out the details of his conversa-
tion with Rudolf, but they are given in a dispatch of Lippomano to Venice of 27 
March 1584. Bathory would not have to take an oath, so as not to anger the Sul-
tan. Rudolf had turned the decision, as usual, over to his Council of State. The 
actual lands being offered were Nagybanya and the rest of the previous offer, 
170 Ibid., 127-129. Bathory wrote Possevino the same day and again claimed that he had never 
desired the dismemberment of Hungary or the incorporation of the compensation into Transylva-
nia. Ibid., 129n. 
171 Ibid., 73. 
172 Ibid., 130. This meeting with Imperial officials is probably the long meeting with Johann 
Trautson, the Imperial privy counsellor, that Possevino described in his letter of March 13 to Car-
dinal Gallio: ibid., 138. 
173 For the date of the audience, see Possevino's letter to Bolognetti, 23 March 1584: MPV VII, 
149. 
174 Possevino to Gallio, 28 March 1584: ibid., 160-161. 
175 PO.$sevino to Zamoyski, 21 March 1584: SIEMIENSKl, 278. 
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which was deemed acceptable to Biithory and had the advantage of being in 
Transylvania, unlike the Szatmar lands which were in Hungary176. 
The discussion then turned to the friendship treaty, which was far more 
than a mere statement of friendship. The two crowns promised indissoluble 
friendship so that should need arise they were to give support and help for the 
common defense. Both foreswore designs on the other's territory. Rebelling vas-
sals from one prince were not to be received by the other but driven away. 
Should subjects of different princes have a quarrel that they could not resolve 
themselves, the two princes would delegated a decision to joint representatives. 
All roads and rivers were open to traffic by the merchants of the two countries. 
Mechanisms were adopted to settle problems from subjects of one country com-
mitting outrages in the other177• At this juncture a final settlement of the dispute 
seemed at hand. 
The month of April threatened to undo the progress of March, at least if the 
Venetian ambassador is to be believed. Officially the loophole suggested by 
Zamoyski and presented to Rudolf by Possevino so that Biithory would not have 
to take an oath to Rudolf as King of Hungary was turned over to Council of 
Hungary (sitting in Vienna) for consideration178. Rome remained optimistic, for 
Gallio wrote Possevino that His Holiness would be greatly consoled by the com-
mon benefit a settlement would bring to both princes and all Christendom179. In 
contrast, on April 3 Lippomano was reporting a minor diplomatic revolution 
arising from improving relations between Biithory and the Turks and from dete-
riorating relations between the Habsburgs and the Turks. The Sultan had sent an 
envoy to Biithory, who freed Turkish prisoners taken by the cossacks and had 
the heads cut off some sixty cossacks in the presence of the envoy. One impor-
tant court official at Prague (unnamed) recited for Lippomano a list of Biithory's 
old grievances against the Habsburgs and accused him of quietly fostering the 
growing discontent among the Hungarians, for instance by his refusal to take the 
oath to Rudolf18o. On April 17 Lippomano reported that at Biithory's behest 
Zamoyski had written to Possevino in Prague that the King had decided to go 
back to his original demands: the return of Szatmar and his original family pos-
sessions, on the promise that he would dismantle the Szatmar fortifications and 
pay the Emperor 30,000 scudi. «The negotiation has reached a worse stage than 
ever before .... Father Possevino in short lives between hope and fear». The rea-
son Lippomano gave for the reversal was that Biithory did not want to give the 
Turks the impression that he enjoyed cordial relations with Rudolfl8l . 
176 KARPATHY-KRAVJANSZKY, 193. 
177 Ibid. , 194. 
178 Possevino to GaJlio, 3 and 11 April 1584: MPV VII, 164 175. 
179 Ibid., 205. 
180 KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 194-196. 
181 Ibid., 197-198. Lippomano was being kept abreast of the negotiations by Possevino, who 
sent him letters dated March 27, April 17 and May 9 (MPV VII, 215n) so he had good sources of 
information. Possevino wrote Zamoyski from Prague on April 30 that he had heard about an ac-
cord between Bathory and the Turks and that he was still awaiting the Emperor 's response, which 
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Faced with the stubbornness of both parties, Possevino tried a new ploy at 
the end of April: Bathory should take over from his nephew Sigismund, for 
whom he was de facto regent of Transylvania, the investiture of the places of-
fered by the Emperor as recompense, but the Emperor was to free them from 
taxes and other obligations. Initially neither side responded to this suggestion; 
on May 1 the Emperor urged Possevino to go to Poland and see if Bathory 
would accept Possevino's newest suggestion before he himself had to make a 
decision, but Possevino developed a serious sore on one arm which prevented 
his departure182. The Emperor took the unusual step of allowing Possevino to ne-
gotiate for him, under certain conditions, with BMhory. Nagybanya would be 
given to Bathory and his family without any oath or onerous conditions but only 
by a letter of investiture. The letter would be renewed in case the lord of the ter-
ritory changed, but if the BMhory family were to die out entirely, the dominion 
would revert to the Emperor183. Clearly Rudolf was accepting the legal maneuver 
suggested by Zamoyski to avoid any oath or conditions that Bathory might re-
gard as indignities. 
Since Possevino's arm prevented his going in person to see BMhory, he 
send the Emperor's response by courier. He was fearful that Turkish pressure 
might deter the King from reaching a final settlement with Rudolf. Possevino 
also suggested to Rudolf that the whole business be concluded either without 
restitution of the ten villages (portiones) or that BMhory surrender his claims to 
three of them and the other seven be given as restitution to his relatives, on con-
dition that they could be exchanged for other territory l 84. Rudolf agreed to his 
suggestions185. Possevino requested from Rudolf an additional document clarify-
ing the details186, to which Rudolf again responded favorably187. 
On May 14 Possevino wrote and asked Bathory to accept this arrangement 
for the seven manors as the best that could be done188. The day previously he had 
he was not pressing for, but <<I do not wonder over the delay, for I see how slowly everything else 
is done here». SIEMIENSKl, III, 290. 
182 Lippomano's dispatchs of May 1, 8 and 15: ibid., 198 199. 
183 Rudolf II's response to Possevino, 1 May 1584: MPV VII, 223n. Possevino sent copies of 
the Imperial document and his own response to it to Cardinal Gallio on May 8: ibid., 232. Bo-
nomi, the nuncio to the Imperial court, was apparently present when Rudolf's response was given 
to Possevino and related to Cardinal Gallio (1 May 1584) a conversation on that occasion with 
Johann Trautson, the Emperor's Privy Counsellor. He asked Gallio to keep his account secret. 
Trautson indicated that the Emperor's action was partly designed to prevent Bathory from adding 
new conditions. Bonomi replied that given Bathory's bellicose nature and the fact that he had pat-
ched up his relations with the Turks, the Emperor would be well advised to move quickly toward 
a settlement of their dispute. Trautson agreed and came close to admitting that because of these 
reasons the Imperial court stood in fear of Bathory. Ibid., 224. For all that Poland and the Empire 
were putting the final touches on the long deferred friendship pact, their real relation was one of 
mutual distrust. 
184 3 May 1584: MPV VII, 232n. 
185 Possevino to Gallio, 15 May 1584; ibid., 246. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Possevino to Zamoyski, 13 May 13: SIEMIENSKl, II, 295. Possevino again thanked Za-
mo~ski for his crucial suggestion on how to get around the problem of an oath. Ibid. 
1 8 MPV VII, 245n. 
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written Zamoyski and said that he preferred to stay in Prague where he could 
finish the negotiations quietly in the name of the Pope and to the honor of the 
King. He felt that Bathory would be pleased with his work since he had done 
nothing without Zamoyski's instructions and begged for freedom to clear up the 
problem of the seven portiones189• 
B<ithory felt otherwise. He wrote Zamoyski on May 23 that Possevino 
should shortly come to him at Grodno since he wanted to deal with Possevino 
face to face and not by letters, «for our affairs with the Emperor are not going 
forward sincerely but violently. We recoil from this agreement and are of two 
minds and doubtful about what We should do». In the next five lines of his letter 
the King referred to his royal dignity three times and concluded: 
«Let the Emperor grant us whatever he wants for our [relatives]; if he does not take 
proper account of our dignity or injures it in the slightest way, we shall utterly repudiate 
his offers, even if magnificent»I90. 
B<ithory's hypersensitivity about his dignity did not augur well for the 
prompt settlement which all the other parties involved were hoping for. 
Bathory went on to tell Zamoyski about his hope that the Turks might be-
come embroiled in war against the Tartars (<<diabolus cum diabolis»), for then 
«our affairs would never be safer». He mentioned that two days earlier the nun-
cio Bolognetti had brought good news about a league of Christian princes 
against the Turks. B<ithory claimed that his heart was in the projectl9l. 
Bolognetti wrote Cardinal Gallio a long account of his discussion with the 
King, which lasted nearly four hours. The King reviewed several possible con-
figurations of a league against the Turks and their chances of success and differ-
ent strategies that ,might be employed, depending on which Christian powers 
joined the league192. 
On May 29 Bolognetti reported to Gallio on another audience with 
Bathory. The King's wish that the Turks and Tartars become embroiled in war 
was being fulfilled. Less welcome was Bathory's caustic remarks about the 
Szatmar negotiations, for instance that he was not going to be satisfied with 
going around begging for an answer from the Imperial court, that the Imperial 
counsellors were searching for new pretexts to drag out negotiations and had 
no intention of ever coming to closure. Bathory claimed that at the beginning 
he had turned the whole business over to the wise judgement of the Pope. 
Bolognetti replied that despite the fact that the Pope had embraced the project 
and assigned the task to Possevino, who had spared no effort, the King had 
gone ahead and appointed Bishop Rozdrazewski as his representative and had 
thereby complicated procedures from the outset. Bolognetti wrote Gallio that 
189 SIEMIENSKI, II, 295. 
190 Ibid., 311-312. 
191 Ibid., 312-313. 
192 23 May 1584: MPV VII, 261-265. 
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Possevino's presence at the Polish court was needed to disentangle the nego-
tiations193. 
Meanwhile Possevino was still at Prague and ailing. On June 14 he reported 
to Gallio that he had heard nothing from Bathory on the Szatmar question but 
had receive a letter from Zamoyski194. That letter (dated 29 May 1584) added de-
tails for a final settlement which Bathory had sent Zamoyski. The settlement 
should make clear the dignity of Bathory's family and be written in honorificis 
verbis and deal with the automatic inheritance of one family member on the 
death of another, the line of descent being laid down by Bathory. Their inheri-
tance was not to be encumbered by any fees. Zamoyski urged Possevino to send 
him the text of the investiture documents as soon as possible so that he could 
show them to the King, for that 
«would bring no small hope of bending the heart of his Royal Majesty, especially if 
to them is added the fact that his [Imperial] Majesty makes no more difficulties about 
those other portiones, although they are small in themselves». 
Zamoyski went on to hope that an end to the Szatmar dispute was at last at 
hand. He added briefly two items of news with larger implications for the direc-
tion of Polish policy: a Polish-Turkish peace treaty and the death of Ivan the 
Terrible195. . 
Since Possevino could not come to Poland, the task of dealing with Bathory 
fell to Cardinal Bolognetti, as he reported to the Cardinal Secretary Gallio on 
June 17. Possevino forwarded to Bolognetti several documents he had obtained 
from the Emperor. Bolognetti took two forms to Bathory, one drawn up on the 
usual form of mutual agreements (compatationes), the other in the form of a 
concession made by the Emperor to the house of Bathory196. In the first document 
Bathory made a few changes regarding the places named. Bathory repeated that 
he was so tired of the whole affair and of the delaying tactics by the Emperor's 
representatives that he had decided not to send them any more correspondence 
or ambassadors on the issue, but he did not want to stop what the nuncios were 
doing in obedience to the Pope. Bolognetti promised that Possevino would keep 
working at Prague on the minor details still needed to finish the negotiations. 
The one outstanding issue was the sharing of the income from the ten villages 
being turned over to the Bathory, two thirds of which was to go to the Bathory 
family, one third being retained by the Emperor in the Imperial offer. The dis-
cussion on this point was long, and Bolognetti urged the King to allow some 
compromise for the sake of the Emperor's friendship. Bathory yielded and 
agreed to forgo not only the three villages which he had been willing to give up 
during the negotiations at Cassovia but two more. Bolognetti even tried to get 
193 29 May 1584: ibid., 281-282. 
194 Ibid., 296. 
195 SIEMIENSKl, UI, 322. On June 19 Lippomano reported the details of Zamoyski's letter to the 
Venetian government, information which Possevino doubtless gave him: KARpATHY-KRAvJAN-
SZKY, 200. 
196 These documents seem to have disappeared: MPV VII, 304n. 
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B<Hhory to promise to forego the other five or at least allow Possevino discretion 
on the matter, but here the King refused to budge, nor would he allow his re-
maining five villages to pay the usual fees to the Emperor. Here Bolognetti fore-
saw the danger of new difficulties arising. At this juncture the King «replied to 
me so expansively and with such determination and brought forward so many 
arguments that I do not know if I can remember them». Most of the arguments 
touched his dignity: fear that the impression he would leave his posterity was 
that of a weak man who cared little about them or his own dignity, who was 
looking out for his own interests rather than his family. The King recounted how 
one village (Buli) went back in his family hundreds of years thanks to the valor 
shown by one off his ancestors back in the crusades. He concluded by saying 
that he was willing to give up five villages but would break off negotiations if 
the Emperor would not give him the other five, but he asserted he had no inten-
tion of going to war over the issue. So determined was the King that Bolognetti 
abandoned hope of gaining more concessions, «at least for now». Bolognetti 
concluded that he was sending on information about the King' s concessions to 
Possevino in Prague with the hope that he could use them to wrap up the whole 
dispute there. He felt it unlikely that more concessions could be wrung from 
B<Hhory and was fearful that the delicate issue of homage or subjection might 
arise again197. 
On June 23 Possevino wrote to Zamoyski about the progress of the Szatmar 
negotiations. Since he was unsure of the King's reaction to the Emperor's most 
recent statement on the issue, it seemed unwise for the Hungarian Chancery to 
draw up as yet a formula of investiture, but he had a document from the Emperor 
which rather explicitly dropped the oath and other burdens. He promised that he 
would not allow the inclusion of anything that did not speak honorably of the 
King and his family. Now that the negotiations were almost completed he 
doubted if the Emperor would quibble over words. Possevino would avoid rais-
ing the question of the ten villages until he heard from Bathory, whom he hoped 
to see in Lublin in August. The Emperor was being careful to take account of 
B<Hhory's dignity in the negotiations, and Possevino foresaw no problems over 
the projected friendship treaty. Once that was taken care of, the King could turn 
his attention to the unfolding situation in Russia. Possevino went on to relate re-
cent details of the fighting between Turks and Tartars198• Later Possevino related 
to Gallio a conversation in which the Emperor suggested as soon as Possevino 
197 Ibid., 303-307. Possevino and Bolognetti went over this discussion on August 1, when Pos-
sevino reached Warsaw. Possevino forwarded to Rudolf a detailed summary of the discussion on 
August 3 together with a formula drawn up by Bathory's officials and approved by the King. It in-
cluded a plea that there be no further delays in settling the dispute. Bathory insisted that he be gi-
ven five villages, which were destined for his blood relatives (<<quae ad consanguinos suos perti-
nent» . These five he would not surrender, but he was willing to leave to the Emperor's decision 
the question of the other five «<quae minus propinquos suos attingerent»). ARSI Opp. NN. 330 
133r-134v. The fact that Bathory was childless and only the elected king of Poland may have con-
ditioned his need to provide security for his relatives. 
198 SIEMIENSKI, III, 335-337. Lippomano reported that Bathory 's attention was increasingly tur-
ned toward developments in Russia after the death of Ivan IV, so that both he and Rudolf had an 
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spoke with Bathory in Lublin and obtained information about what the King 
wanted, Rudolf would see to it that no more delays or difficulties would arise 
from his side199. 
While on his way to Lublin Possevino stopped on August 1 at Warsaw to 
confer with Bolognetti on how to conclude the Szatmar affair2OO• The discussion 
turned on the details of the villages to be turned over to Bathory, but Bolognetti 
could no longer remember the precise villages in question. Bolognetti argued 
against having a statement on this or the investiture being formulated in Prague 
since that would involve more delays201. 
By late August Possevino was in Lublin; after conferring with King 
Stephan he reported to the King that he had written Prague on certain details of 
their discussion: that the King had never read the details of the protocols govern-
ing his possession of Szatmar but was content that the same stipulations apply to 
Nagybanya and its adjacent territory which was being given to him and to the 
lands being given to his relatives as compensation. Possevino asserted his confi-
dence that now «the whole business will be carried forward very nicely into ef-
fect ... and that as your Royal Majesty has come to know the whole mind of his 
Imperial Majesty ... » a solid friendship between the monarchs could be estab-
lished. Possevino rejoiced that Bathory had promised to provide him with a draft 
of the friendship treaty before the Polish senators who had gathered for the Diet 
at Lublin departed202• 
The King wrote Gregory XIII on August 27 to praise Possevino and urged 
the Pontiff to «trust him in all these affairs». The King stated that he had given 
Possevino an oral message of great importance to bring the Pope personally but 
did not specify its details203• Possevino confided to Cardinal Bolognetti that the 
King was planning to attack Russia, which was in disorder after the death of 
Ivan IV, and wanted papal subsidies for the project204• An attack on Russia could 
be seen either as a distraction from the papal project of an anti-Turk league or a 
preliminary step toward forcing the Russians into a broader coalition. 
On August 27 Bathory gave Possevino a written statement of his position 
that paralleled their discussion a few days earlier. He gave Possevino broad 
powers in dealing with the Emperor about five of the villages, the claim to which 
. additional reason to wrap up the Szatmiir dispute. Dispatches of June 26 and July 24: KARPATHY-
KRAVJANSZKY, 20l. 
199 17 July 1584: MPV VII, 366. If earlier the Emperor's side was the cause of most delays, du-
ring the later stages of the negotiations that dubious honor belonged to Biithory. Bonomi, the nun-
cio at Prague, wrote Gallio on July 17 about Possevino going to Lublin to end «this blessed agree-
ment, about which we are astonished that no response has ever come from his Majesty». Rumors 
were circulating in Prague that now the Biithory had achieved a favorable treaty with the Turks, 
he was ha;boring sinister designs. MPV VII, 383n . 
. 200 Bolognetti to Gallio, 2 August 1584: ibid., 383. 
201 Possevino to Gallio, 2 August 1584: ibid., 385. 
202 Ibid., 417. Possevino's letter to the King is undated; the editor ofMPV dates it circa August 
25. 
203 Ibid., 419. 
204 Bolognetti to Gallio, 28 August 1584; ibid, 420. 
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he was willing to forego. But Nagybanya and its adjacent territories were first to 
be handed over to his free possession together with Buli and a village lying near 
the fortress of Ziniriwarallia. The Emperor would be then given time to deliber-
ate over the details of the remaining villages or equivalent compensation that the 
King insisted upon. The compensation should be made to Bathory himself and to 
the legitimate heirs of his three brothers and three sisters205 . With these instruc-
tions in hand Possevino set out for Prague and Rome after some intermediate 
stops. Meanwhile Gregory XIII had decided that while the Holy See was not op-
posed to Bathory's contemplated designs on Russia, neither was it about to back 
the project without a great deal of reflection and making certain about the atti-
tudes of the other powers and of the forthcoming Polish Diet. The papacy, more-
over, was in no position financially to provide massive subsidies for Bathory's 
designs. Therefore Gallio told Possevino not to come to Rome and to leave this 
whole matter in the hands of Bolognetti and other papal representatives206. Pos-
sevino arrived in Prague by mid October. Prospects for a final settlement seemed 
good. His friend Lippomano reported to Venice that what was needed was «only 
a few more honorable words in the instrument of compensation, which one thing 
will be easily obtained>>207. 
Negotiations did not go so easily. The Emperor noted two discrepancies 
in Bathory's newest proposals compared to previous negotiations, one was the 
number of villages in question, the other was the request that the investiture 
could also pass through the female line208. Possevino referred these objections 
back to Bathory for a decision209. Bolognetti wrote the King that he had heard 
from Bonomi, the' nuncio in Prague, that Rudolf would allow him to change 
the «formulation handed down by the Emperor as long as the substance itself 
of the things agreed upon was not changed»21O. The King would have to decide 
whether to act immediately or await Possevino's expected return from Prague211. 
205 Ibid. , 430n. About this time Bolognetti achieved some success in efforts to get Bathory to 
moderate his demands. The King was willing to forego five portiones or villages but insisted on 
being given the three he had obtained at Cassovia through Berzeviczy plus two more. At Bolo-
gnetti's urging, he agreed that they should pay the customary taxes to Rudolf as King of Hungary 
but Nagybanya should be held under <<the sam~ law, form, privileges and conditions» that Szat-
mar and Nemethy had possessed: ibid., 699. 
206 Gallio to Possevino, 29 September and 20 October 1584: ibid., 451' 452 462. 
207 Dispatch of 16 October 1584. KARPATHY-KRAvJANszKY, 201. This was Lippomano's last 
dispatch; Matteo Zane took over as Venetian ambassador at Prague in early November: MPV VII, 
492. On November 5 Possevino wrote Bolognetti that he had been struck by fever fifty days pre-
viously: ibid. 
208 Decree of the Emperor: 27 October 1584: ARSI Opp. NN 330 180r-181r. 
209 1 November 1584: MPV VII, 491n. 
210 11 November 1584: ibid., 501. 
2ll Ibid., On 16 December 1584 Possevino had a conversation with Rudolf and tried to per-
suade him to allow investiture to the female line and grant the Bathory five portiones. Ibid., 
559n. 
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The King decided that much might depend on a turn of phrase and thought 
it best to wait till he could talk to Possevino212• 
The year 1584 ended without resolving anything. The Polish Diet showed 
little interest in an attack on the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. Their disinterest 
suited papal policy nicely, as Bolognetti observed to Cardinal Galiio. The Pope 
was of that hook213. The Emperor could also take quiet pleasure from the Diet. 
The new Venetian ambassador at Prague, Matteo Zane, reported that the Em-
peror had less fear of the Polish King than in the past, not because of Rudolf's 
own military strength, but because any move on the part of the King would not 
enjoy the support of the Polish estates and would depend upon B<ithory's own 
forces and not the Polish army, for the dispute was a private affair of the House 
of Bathory. Zane predicted more delays in the negotiations214. Possevino wrote 
Gallio on December 31 that newly arrived clarifications from Bolognetti and 
Zamoyski, which the Emperor had requested, might lead to minor adjustments215 . 
The next day Possevino presented to Rudolf a new phrasing that neither in-
cluded nor excluded explicitly inheritance through the female line so that «the 
compensation was to be handed on in same way that Szatmar was»216. On Jan-
uary 9 Rudolf informed him that he had forwarded his latest statement to Arch-
duke Ernest, and that Possevino was welcome to remain in Prague awaiting the 
Archduke's reply or to go ·to Poland, but the Emperor indicated that he preferred 
his going to Poland to facilitate B<ithory's acceptance of the formula of investi-
ture217. 
Possevino finally left Prague on January 15. As he was leaving he wrote 
Cardinal Gallio and speculated that the Turks might take advantage of the pro-
longed negotiations to reach a peace with the Persians and turn their attention 
to Hungary and that likewise Bathory might find Turkish support more valuable 
212 Bolognetti to Possevino, 28 November 1584: ibid., 532n. On November 1 Blithory had writ-
ten Bolognetti complaining about how equivocal the new Imperial proposals were and said he 
wanted to discuss them with Possevino: «Scripturas istas de negotio Zatmari et Nemeti per leg i-
mus, in quibus illas quas D.V. notavit aequivocationes animavertimus et has totas esse summo in-
genio constructas et ordinatas, ipsaque adeo verba ea quadam arte compos ita, ut totum negotium 
reddatur infestum. Retinendas vero apud nos ad P. Possevini adventum iudicavimus, ut cum eo 
presente de iis conferamus ipsique men tern et sententiam nostram aperiamus». Ibid., 484. 
213 11 December 1584; ibid., 547. 
214 Dispatch of 11 December 1584: !URpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 201 202. In his dispatch of De-
cember 25 Zane noted that Possevino was preparing to leave Prague to return to Poland; he had 
been engaged partly with details of the Szatmlir dispute, partly with those of the friendship pact. 
Ibid., 202. On December 29 Possevino wrote Bolognetti from Prague that he was still awaiting a 
resRonse from the Emperor and hoped to leave within eight days: MPV VII 565. 
5 Ibid., 566 567. . 
216 Ibid., 567n. On the same day Zane reported that Possevino was staying in Prague and trying 
to acquire more latitude and authority from the Imperial ministers, but these were standing firm 
because an attempt of a Polish king to use force would be checked by constitutional limits. Posse-
vino meanwhile was stressing Blithory's strength and valor as a bargaining tool, so much so that 
his impartiality was under suspicion. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 203. Zane repeated the accusa-
tion of partiality on January 15: ibid., 204. 
217 ARSI Opp. NN. 330 223. 
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for his interests in Poland and Transylvania and for his designs on Muscovy 
than would be an agreement with the Emperor218. 
On January 31 the Emperor, however, finally made a decision on the ongo-
ing differences in a decree he gave to the new nuncio at Prague, Germanico 
Malaspina, to pass on to Cardinal Bolognetti in Poland. The Emperor agreed to 
increase his offer to the Polish King beyond the three districts (pagi) already 
agreed on to include five additional villages (portiones) . These were handed 
over, as had been suggested by Possevino, «in the way that Szatmar was, that is, 
govern by the same conditions». The Emperor was doing this so that «his whole-
hearted zeal in establishing and strengthening mutual benevolence, friendship 
and good neighborly relations with his Serene Majesty may be more evident». 
The Emperor hoped that this decision would put a final end to the long negotia-
tions219. 
The decree was indeed the breakthrough which led to the final settlement. 
Malaspina sent a copy through his assistant Pelegrino to Bolognetti, who passed 
it on to Bathory, who was very pleased by it and said that he wold be prompt in 
putting it into effect and having the negotiations concluded22o. Still he passed it to 
his Berzeviczy, Chancellor of Transylvania, to examine and make minor 
changes. Later Bolognetti sent Malaspina a long dispatch which contained a 
copy of Berzeviczy's careful revisions221 • 
On February 19 Possevino wrote Gallio from Warsaw and noted that he 
was still waiting for the decree which the Emperor had given the nuncio 
Malaspina. He felt that, while more complications might arise, given the good 
will of Bathory, hy expected no real difficulties in reaching a final settle-
mene22. 
The reason that Possevino had not received the Emperor's decree was not 
the customary delays; rather he was being cut out of the negotiations, largely be-
cause of rising resentment at the Imperial Court where he was seen as partial to 
the Polish King. The Venetian Ambassador at Prague reported on January 15 the 
dissatisfaction there over Possevino's partiality223. The Jesuit Marcus Pitacic at 
Prague reported to his Provincial similar accusations being made by court offi-
218 15 January 1585: MPV VII, 580. • 
219 Ibid., 604-605. There is a copy of the decree among Possevino' s papers, ARSI Opp. NN. 330 
233. Zane noted (5 February 1585) that the decree got around explicitly allowing hereditary 
claims in the female line but in fact yielded to the substance of Polish King's demand. Zane, who 
only a month earlier had been making pessimistic reports, thought the decree should establish so-
lid :£eace and good relations between the monarchs. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 204. 
2 MPV VII, 420. 
221 The dispatch was drawn up iiI several stages (Februrary 24 to March 7). The final document 
settling the disputed and signed by Bathory and Berzeviczy (6 July 1585) closely parallels Bolo-
gnetti's dispatch: ibid., 648-655. 
222 Ibid., 624. 
223 KARPATHY-KRAvJANSZKY, 204. 
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cials224 . He was not the only Jesuit maki~g such reports225. Cutting Possevino out 
of the final phase of the negotiations seems to have heen done at the request of 
the Emperor or of his officials, who may have felt he was usurping their role in 
the negotiations. The negotiations henceforward were to be facilitated by the 
regular nuncios Bolognetti and Malaspina, even though Cardinal Bolognetti was 
also suspected at the Imperial Court of partiality toward BMhory and was sched-
uled to be replaced in March by the new 'nuncio to Poland226 . While defending 
Possevino against the accusations of Jesuits in Prague and Vienna, the Jesuit 
General Claudio Acquaviva227 went to Cardinal Gallio and asked that hencefor-
ward Possevino confine his work as nuncio to the several papal seminaries he 
had helped to found in northern and eastern Europe. Gallio took the matter to 
Gregory XIII, who agreed to this arrangement. On Februrary 9 Gallio wrote Pos-
sevino and asked him to put aside the Szatmar dispute and go to Braunsberg 
(Braniewo) where he was to await priests being sent from Rome for work in 
Sweden228 . 
There can be little doubt that Possevino admired the energetic Bathory 
more than the enigmatic Rudolf, a preference shared by most historians. He 
certainly developed a closer working relationship with the Polish King than 
with the Emperor. Early in the negotiations Possevino complained about the 
procrastination of the Imperial bureaucracy, as did many others, but in the later 
stages of the negotiations it was Bathory's stubbornness and touchiness over 
his dignity that had become the roadblock to a solution, and Possevino had 
worked hard to bring the King to accept the Imperial compensation as an offer 
made in good faith. Paramount always for Possevino in the negotiations were 
the twin goals of Gregory XIII: harmony between the two great Catholic monar-
224 Pitacic to Henricus Blyssem, February 1585: LuKAcs II, 767-769, 16*. Pitacic was born at 
Sisak, Croatia, c. 1548, entered the Society 18 August 1566 at Vienna, and died 13 January 1608 
at Ebemdorf. Blyssem was born at Bonn, Germany, c. 1530, entered the Society in Rome in 1555, 
and died 24 April 1586 at Graz. . 
225 Ioannes Nicholas Donius [born c. 1538 in Baelen-sur-Nethe, Belgium; entered the Society 1 
July 1556 at Cologne; died 4 April 1594 at Vienna], the Jesuit rector at Vienna, reported to the Je-
suit General Claudio Acquaviva that the Imperial Vice Chancellor Schelm was calling Possevino 
unsteady, inconsistent and a traitor to the Emperor; 11 February 1585: ibid., 769. Acquaviva re-
plied with a defense of Possevino, but indicated that he hoped that Possevino would soon be re-
leased from his diplomatic activities, something that Possevino himself had repeatedly requested 
of Acquaviva: ibid. 
226 Zane 's dispatch of 15 January 1585: KARPATHY-KRAVJANSZKY, 204. 
227 Acquaviva was born 14 September 1543 at Atri, entered the Society at Rome 12 iuly 1567, 
was elected General 19 February 1581, and died 31 January 1615 at Rome. 
228 Acquaviva to Father Gregor Roseff (born 22 July 1538 at Landshut; entered Society 15 Sep-
tember 1559 at Vienna; died 15 February 1623 at Augsburg), rector at the Imperial college, 21 
February 1585; LuKAcs, II, 832n; the Polish Provincial, Giovanni Paolo Campa no (born 25 Ja-
nuary 1540 at Reggio Emilia; entered Society 15 September 1563 at Rome; died 27 April 1592 at 
Rome), who much admired Possevino, defended Possevino in letters to Acquaviva, 27 February 
and 1 March 1585: ibid. , 832n and 836n. Acquaviva's decision to petition Gregory XIII for Pos-
sevino's removal from the negotiations was probably motivated by fear that hostility to Possevino 
might foster a general hostility to Jesuits at the Imperial court. For Gallio's letter to Possevino: 
Opp. NN. 330 245. 
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chs of eastern Europe and the projected alliance against the Turks. His personal 
admiration for Bathory was totally subordinate to these major ends. 
Possevino blamed Malaspina and others for stirring up the hostility at the 
Imperial court that led to his dismissal. He traced that hostility to his having re-
buffed Malaspina when the nuncio made accusations of avarice and peculation 
against the previous nuncio, Bonomi. Possevino also felt that Malaspina re-
sented his prominent role in the negotiations, even though he was a mere priest 
and not a bishop like the other nuncios229. Given the hostility toward him both by 
Malaspina at Prague and by Bolognetti at the Polish court230, Possevino had be-
come a liability to papal diplomacy, even though he had the best knowledge of 
the whole Szatmar dispute and still enjoyed Bathory's favor. 
On February 27 Possevino wrote a long letter to Malaspina23 1. It is polite on 
the surface, but at points Possevino's resentment emerges, especially when he 
notes that he was deliberately prevented from seeing the most recent documents 
from Prague about the negotiations. In fact, Bathory himself had informed him 
about their contents. Possevino took pride in the fact that his phrasing had been 
used to get around the problem of inheritance through the female line and that he 
knew the territories in question better than the court officials in Prague, thanks to 
his personal inspection of the places in question during his tour of Transylvania. 
He made a point of his papal authorization to carryon the negotiations-his letter 
suggests that he had not yet received notice of his dismissal. But he did acknowl-
edge several times that he was held in suspicion by officials at the Imperial 
court232. 
In fact Possevino kept in contact with Bathory on the negotiations: at the 
end of February, just before departing for Braunsberg, he wrote the King that «I 
no longer doubt that the whole business will be carried to an excellent outcome». 
He went on to encourage Bathory to cultivate the Emperor's friendship since 
will bear «richer' fruit for the Christian commonwealth»233. Bathory replied that 
Possevino letter was «most welcome to us» and that as he had often told Pos-
sevino, he would not allow Rudolf to surpass him in generosity and that the 
agreement with the Emperor will be confirmed and that he was now much more 
certain of his goodwill and that he was sending the Emperor delegation to work 
on the friendship pact234 . 
THE FINAL AGREEMENT 
Although Possevino did not participate in the final negotiations, they were 
soon complete very much in accord with the arrangements he had labored so 
229 Possevino defended himself and made charges against Malaspina in a letter to Acquaviva, 
27 August 1585: LuKAcs II, 832-836. 
230 MPV VII, 749-768. 
231 ASV Nunz. Germ. 95 247-250. 
232 Ibid., 247. 
233 Opp. NN. 330 249. . 
234 Ibid. , 251. Dated the end of February. On May 7 Zane reported to the Venetian government 
that Rudolf, in agreement with Archduke Ernest and the Hungarian Council, had accepted «all the 
conditions [presumably Berzeviczy' s emendations] requested by the King of Poland in recom-
pense for Szatmar». KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 208. 
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long to work out between the two monarchs. Long as the Szatmar negotiations 
had lasted, they took less time than the agreement between Argentina and Chile 
noted at the beginning of this essay. Two documents state the conditions of the 
final agreement, both nearly identical in content. The first was signed by Rudolf 
on 22 June 1585235 . The second by Bathory on July 6236. The documents implicitly 
allow continuous possession by the BMhory family through both male and fe-
male lines. The Polish document alludes to a friendship pact as a motive for the 
agreement237 . In return for all claims to Szatmar and Nemethy Bathory on behalf 
of his family in perpetuity accepted the city of Nagybanya along with the town 
and villages pertaining to it and all their emoluments on the traditional basis of 
ownership. To these were added the villages of Zazar, Bozonta and Totfalu but 
subject to the same obligations as other Hungarian vassals toward the Habsburgs 
but without an oath or act of homage on investiture. On the extinction of the 
Bathory line, the lands were to return to the Hungarian crown. In addition to 
those three villages listed above, five more were added (Zinirwarallia, Parlag, 
Wywaras, Felseofalw and Buli). For these five villages the Bathory family was 
to pay the usual tribute238• The formal investiture ceremony took place at Nagy-
banya on August 20. Rudolf was represented by Count Franz von Revay and 
Franz Nagyvati. BMhory's delegation was led by Martin Berzeviczy, the chan-
cellor of Transylvania239. 
The actual transfer of land held little historical import. The long delays in 
reaching the agreement were, however, disastrous for Gregory XIII's hopes of a 
Balkan crusade against the still menacing Ottoman Empire. The early 1580s pre-
sented the Christian powers with a rare opportunity, since the Turks were en-
gaged in a protracted war (1577-1590) on their eastern flank against the Per-
sians24o. Stephan Bathory was a gifted military commander, as was his chancellor 
Zamoyski. On 15 May 1585 BMhory fell into deep depression, mainly over a re-
buff by the Polish parliament, but the long and frustrating Szatmar negotiations 
undoubtedly contributed to his psychological deterioration. The depression con-
tinued almost down till his sudden death 12 December 1586241 . Seven years later 
Rudolf became engaged in a long and unsuccessful war (1593-1606) against the 
Turks in which Sigismund Bathory, Stephan's successor as Prince of Transylva-
nia, sided with Rudolf. But he neither had Stephan's military gifts, nor was he he 
235 Printed in Gooss, 210-21l. 
236 Ibid., 211-214. 
237 « ••• Maiestas eius Caesarea ut suum vicissim animum uti integerrimum, ita huiusmodi mu-
tuam ac verum benevolentiam atque amicitiam stabiliendam, non minus propensum, quam pu-
blici boni et tranquillitatis studiosissimum, testatum redderet, eo condescendit, ut huiusmodi com-
pensationis medio locum assenserit». Ibid., 212. 
238 Ibid., 213-214. 
239 For the Imperial document, ibid., 215-216. For that of Biithory 's representatives, ibid., 
216-218. 
240 In a letter to Cardinal Gallio (27 August 1583) Bolognetti expressed optimism about a suc-
cessful crusade in the Balkans. MPV VI, 499-502. 
241 DAVIES, I, 432. 
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King of Poland242• In 1597 Sigismund resigned his lands in favor of Rudolf; im-
perial occupation set off intense opposition and Sigismund attempted a futile 
comeback, only to resign again in 1599243. 
SUMARIO 
Gregorio XlII abrigaba la esperanza de unir Venecia, el Emperador Rodolfo II y Es-
teban Bathory de Polonia, en una alianza contra los turcos, pero Bathory insistia en que 
Rodolfo Ie devolviese sus tierras ancestrales (Szatmar y Nemethy), que Maximiliano II Ie 
habia quitado en 1561; Maximiliano, de 1565 a 1567, tuvo prisionero a Biithory, aun 
cuando se trataba de un embajador. Mas tarde Bathory fue elegido principe de Transilva-
nia (1571) y rey de Polonia (1576). Tras la negociaci6n de paz entre Polonia y Moscovia, 
lIevada a cabo por Possevino, Bathory volvi6 a sus antiguas reclamaciones ancestrales, y 
una guerra contra Rodolfo II parecfa inminente, la cual destruiria las esperanzas del pa-
pado de una liga contra el Turco. Possevino desempeii6 el papel mas importante como 
mediad or en unas lentas negociaciones que se extendieron desde 1582 hasta 1585. Ante-
riores historiadores prficticamente hicieron caso omiso de estas negociaciones, aunque 
elias dejaron centenares de documentos. 
Gregorio XlII nombr6 a Possevino mediador, a instancias de Biithory. Possevino ur-
gi6 a Bathory a aceptar una compensaci6n altern at iva, si el Emperador no Ie .devolvia sus 
tierras ancestrales en Transilvania. Aunque Bathory suscit6 el espectro de la guerra, esto 
no pasaba de ser sino una amenaza vacfa, pues no era probable que el Parlamento polaco 
apoyara una guerra para conseguir unas tierras en Transilvania. En junio de 1581, Posse-
vino mantuvo consultas con Rodolfo y sus principales consejeros. Rodolfo aceptaba la 
mediaci6n papal pero rechazaba las reivindicaciones de Bathory - Szatmar era una con-
quista legitima en tiempo de guerra - pero insistia en que deseaba la paz y la amistad con 
el Rey polaco, y abrfa la puerta a una compensaci6n alternativa. Pero i,cual iba a ser, y en 
que consistirfa, esta compensaci6n? Sobre esto giraron interrninablemente las negociacio-
nes durante tres aiios. A complicar mas las' negociaciones sobre una justa compensaci6n, 
vino a sumarse un pacto de amistad y comercio que ambos monarcas querian, y la convic-
ci6n de Bathory de que la Corte imperial no respetaba su dignidad. Los dos monarcas in-
tentaron ganarse el apoyo del Sultan. Una y otra vez, Possevino tuvo que viajar desde Po-
Ionia a Praga, para consul tar sobre las ofertas y las reivindicaciones. Asf Possevino, desde 
septiembre de 1583 hasta enero de 1584, intervino en una reuni6n de delegados de ambos 
monarcas en Cassovia, reuni6n, que no consigui6 apenas nada. 
EI final de 1584 y los inicios de 1585 produjeron por fin una soluci6n definitiva y 
amistosa. EI pacto de amistad y la compensaci6n por Szatmar no deberfan estar fntima-
mente relacionados entre sf. Rodolfo entreg6 Nagybanya y un numero de poblados hun-
garos a la familia Bathory y permiti6 que se pudiera heredar por linea femenina, pero a 
Bathory no se Ie exigi6 que pronunciara un juramento de lealtad a Rodolfo a cambio de 
las posesiones. Los acuerdos finales fueron firmados en Junio y Julio, y se atuvieron a las 
condiciones estipuladas por Possevino, ,pero el papado, en febrero de 1585, destituy6 a 
Possevino de su cargo de mediador, porque el emperador y sus consejeros crefan que era 
demasiado favorable al rey polaco. 
242 On the <<long» war against the Turks, see Jan Paul NIEDERKORN, Die europaischen Machte 
und der «Lange Turkenkrieg» Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1593-1606) (Vienna 1993) and Kenneth M. 
SETION, Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia 1991). 
243 P.F. SUGAR, P. HANAK, and T. FRANK, editors, A History of Hungary (Bloomington 1990) 
131. 
